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GREECE OF TOMORROW

EDITED BY

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
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT recently extended an invitation to citizens and private organizations to draw up plans for the post war period. "There cannot be too much discussion of this kind," he wrote in a letter to the St. Louis Post Dispatch published February 20, 1943, "and there could not be a better time for it." He also placed emphasis on the "important job of education to be done so that the tragedy of war would not come again" and on the fact that "we are fighting for freedom — not only for ourselves but for all peoples everywhere."


Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, voiced the same thought in a recent letter to Professor Ralph Barton Perry, Chairman of the Harvard Group of American Defense, and a member of the Board of Trustees of our organization. He expressed appreciation of the work groups of citizens are doing to further public understanding of the issues of the war. "I should like to emphasize," he added, "that the articulation of American public opinion is a powerful and constructive factor in our dealings with foreign governments."

The problems of the peace to follow this war seem to be more complex and the demands upon statesmen more compelling than at the end of any previous war. The conviction is growing that we must succeed in achieving a just and lasting peace, if our civilization is to survive. Much intelligent thought is being given in all quarters to the problems of peace and to the realization of the Four Freedoms that have become the beacon to our thought.

As a modest contribution to this thinking, we offer here a number of papers dealing with some problems of peace as they affect Greece, a country to which we feel eternally indebted for what she has given to the world throughout her long history, and during the present war.

G. H. C.





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OUR DEBT TO GREECE

THE HEROIC DEFENSE of the Greeks against overwhelming odds and their continuing warfare upon their oppressors have once again called the attention of the Western world to the land from which our European and American culture was so largely drawn and to our debt to Greece.

On many aspects of that debt it is unnecessary to dwell. In the world of art, in spite of many modern movements, the forms developed by the Greeks in architecture, in sculpture and in the minor arts still serve as models. The Greek orders of architecture are constantly employed in public and private buildings, and ornamental patterns developed in Greece adorn our homes in countless ways. Plutarch, indeed, wrote "better than he knew" when he said of the Parthenon and the other great buildings of the Athenian Acropolis:

The buildings of Pericles are the more admired in that they were created in a short period to last a long time. For in beauty each was a classic as soon as it was erected, and even today in its perfection it appears recent and as if just completed. Such is the bloom of newness upon them, making them appear untouched by time, as if there were in them a perennial spirit and a deathless soul.

It is true that the Greek forms as they appear in our own day have often been modified by the ideas of Roman or Renaissance masters, but this is, perhaps, only another evidence of their enduring quality.

Similarly in literature it was the Greeks who first experimented with the many types which have dominated later literature — epic and lyric poetry, tragedy, comedy, history and the rest; and the critical principles laid down by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C., which at times have been so reverently regarded as to fetter creative writing, are still the basis of much modern criticism.

All this is matter of common knowledge and need not be further emphasized. Another aspect of Greek life which has especial importance in these days, when believers in democracy and "the common man" are locked in a life-and-death struggle with totalitarian powers, is the political experience and the political thought of the Hellenic peoples. It has been well said that in ancient Greece one can follow experiments in government conducted on such a small scale, compared with modern conditions, that the results have the value of laboratory experiments. What then can be learned from the development of democracy in Greece? For it must always be remembered that the Greeks were the first people to develop democratic forms of government, which, however limited in scope, represent something that had never been tried before. Until the rise of the Greek city-states, the great kingdoms

of the East had all been organized as monarchies. Professor Speiser has recently argued convincingly that there is a difference between the kingship in Egypt and in the Mesopotamian area in that the Egyptian form was essentially totalitarian, while in Mesopotamia there was from the beginning more respect for the rights of the individual and the development of laws to protect him; and to this, he argues, is due the greater progress of the Mesopotamian peoples in jurisprudence, in mathematics and in the natural sciences. But no one could argue that anything approaching democratic forms of government developed in these older civilizations.

Like their eastern neighbors, the Greeks were at first governed by kings. In the Homeric poems the king is clearly conceived as a being set apart. He has a council of elders whose advice he seeks and whose consent is asked for his decisions; and there is an occasional assembly of the freemen which meets to hear and acclaim the king's decision. How little the common man was regarded appears most clearly in the treatment of Thersites, when he ventures to criticize Agamemnon in the assembly. He is beaten by Ulysses for his presumption and threatened with expulsion from the assembly if he repeats his offense. The popular reaction is all on the side of Ulysses. After the beating Thersites

sat in fear, and grieving and looking foolish he wiped away his tears. But the Greeks, though they were sorry, laughed sweetly at him; and thus spoke many a man looking at his neighbor: "Aha, surely Ulysses has done many a good deed, proposing good plans and implementing war. But this is by far his finest deed among the Argives, for he stopped the wordy slanderer from his blasphemings. Surely his lordly soul will not again urge him to assail the kings with chiding words."

After the Homeric age, the kingship was abolished in most of the Greek states. It survived in Macedonia and, in a much limited form, in Sparta. But in general the history of most Greek communities followed a pattern of gradual development towards democracy. The usual sequence was from kingship to aristocracy and then, with the development of cities and trade, the power of the nobles was weakened as the people demanded clearer definition of their rights by the codification of laws and strove to increase the power of the popular assembly. Not infrequently the struggle resulted in temporary setbacks. In many cases, a powerful noble, taking advantage of popular discontent, seized control of a city and became a tyrant in the Greek sense, that is, a ruler subject to no controls. The word "tyrant" at first had none of its modern connotations; but the tyrant, depending as he did upon force rather than on a legitimate claim to rule, often exercised his power arbitrarily, so that the word came to have the derogatory sense in which it has passed into other languages.

Tyrannies were generally overthrown by a revolt of the people and were followed by reforms in which more power was granted to the popular assembly. We are best informed about the succession of events in Athens, where the expulsion of the tyrant Hippias in 510 B.C. was followed by the reforms of Cleisthenes, who is rightly regarded as the founder of Athenian

democracy. The most important feature of the new constitution was the establishment of an annually elected Council of five hundred members, fifty from each of the ten tribes into which Cleisthenes combined, with modifications, the already existing local bodies or demes. The members for each tribe were chosen by lot, and election by lot, combined as it was with a prescription enforcing rotation of members, assured the result that the Council should be a fair sample of all Athenians. The Council was essentially an administrative body. Through committees it supervised most of the state activities. All proposals to be made to the Ecclesia, the general assembly of all the citizens, must first be considered by the Council and then submitted to the larger body. The power to declare war and the power to conclude a treaty continued to be vested in the assembly of the people. Among the features of the older constitution which Cleisthenes retained was a classification of the citizens into four groups according to income, which was the basis of eligibility to office; to some of the higher offices, especially the archonship, only the members of the two highest classes were eligible.

No other Greek community, so far as we know, had progressed so far as Athens on the road to democracy in the early fifth century, but in most of them the people had come to have a more or less important part in electing their rulers and deciding questions of public policy.

This, then, was the organization of the city-states during the earlier years of the fifth century, when the Greeks repulsed the invading Persians and won undying fame. In these military triumphs the Greeks saw the seal of the gods set upon their civilization, and to the uplift of spirit induced by the defeat of the Persians the whole splendid development of the arts in the fifth century is largely due. How far the victory can be credited to the political organization is perhaps an insoluble question, but it may at least be argued that it was due in no small measure to the fact that the Greek felt himself a part of the state much more than the soldier of the Persian king, and insofar represents a triumph of democracy over absolutism.

The next reforms in the Athenian constitution are associated with the name of Pericles, who rose to power in the 60's of the fifth century and after 461, when his great rival Cimon was banished, practically dominated Athenian politics until his death in 429. In the early years of the Periclean Age, the principle of selection by lot was carried further. Certain officials, of whom expertness was required, such as generals, ambassadors and members of special committees, were chosen by popular vote; but all other magistrates were designated by lot. Pay or, perhaps more accurately, indemnity payment, was introduced for many offices which had hitherto been unpaid and so practically impossible for poorer citizens to hold; and in pursuance of the same policy the archonship was thrown open to all classes of the population; indemnity payment was also introduced for the judges in the *Heliaea*, or popular courts. This institution, which goes back to the days of Solon, is often cited as evidence of the scope of Athenian democracy. Every citizen was eligible for jury duty. By the time of Pericles the courts had become so crowded with business that many citizens could not afford to undertake jury duty. After the reform of Pericles, a panel of 6000 jurors

was easily maintained. The large number is due to the fact that the normal panel of jurors was large — the minimum for private suits was 201, for public suits 401 — but for important cases panels of 1001 or 1501 were used.

We have a remarkable record of the feeling of an Athenian towards his city and its institutions in the famous Funeral Oration which Pericles delivered in the winter of the year 431–430 over those who had fallen in the first year of the Peloponnesian War. It is impossible to say how closely the historian's account records the actual words of the statesman, but the Funeral Oration may certainly be taken as an expression of the Athenian attitude.

We live under a form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbours; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which some follow, rather than imitators of other peoples. It is true that our government is called a democracy, because its administration is in the hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on an equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service. And not only in our public life are we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuits of everyday life; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we render obedience to those in authority and to the laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained for the succour of the oppressed and those which, though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a disgrace which all men recognize.

Moreover, we have provided for the spirit many relaxations from toil: we have games and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and homes fitted out with good taste and elegance; and the delight we each day find in these things drives away sadness. And our city is so great that all the products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our own soil with no more home-felt security of enjoyment than we do those of other lands.*

The ideals of democracy have surely never been better stated than in the Funeral Oration. When, however, we examine the history of Athens in the Periclean Age we have to confess that Greek democracy had serious limitations. The greatest curse of Greece was the narrowness of the Greek conception of patriotism. The citizen was loyal to his city, but rarely capable of a wider loyalty. Even in the great crisis of the Persian Wars, some Greek cities sided with the Persians, and alliances among the several states rarely lasted for any long period. Indeed, the conquest of Greece by Philip of Macedon in the fourth century and the later conquest by the Romans were

* Thucydides, Book II, xxxvii, xxxviii, translated by Professor C. Foster Smith in the Loeb Classical Library *Thucydides*.

largely due to the inability of the Greek states to unite for a common purpose. It may not unfairly be argued that the collapse of the League of Nations was due to similar provincialism on a larger scale.

Another aspect of Athenian democracy which is not without its warning for the twentieth century is the history of the Athenian Empire. Shortly after the Persian repulse in 479, the Athenians organized a league, primarily of the cities in the Aegean area, to defend Greece from further aggression. From the fact that the directive was set up in the island of Delos, the confederacy was called the Delian League. Member cities agreed to furnish ships for a joint navy in proportion to their wealth, or, if a city preferred, to make a contribution in money. The League was to be managed by a Council in which each member had an equal voice, but because of her large contribution, Athens naturally had a preponderant influence from the beginning. The first assessment was entrusted to the famous Aristides and the fairness with which it was levied contributed largely to his fame as "the just" Aristides; and the so-called Hellanotamiae, who had charge of the tribute, were Athenian officials. It soon developed that many even of the larger cities preferred to make their contributions in money rather than in ships. Then the ships were built at Athens and became part of the Athenian navy. Under these conditions, the temptation to use the League for their own aggrandizement was too much for the Athenians. In 472 they employed the fleet to force membership on the city of Carystus, which had refused to join; three years later when Naxos attempted to secede from the League, the island was blockaded and the Naxians were forced to continue their membership; and shortly after, the Thasians were compelled to continue as members when they tried to withdraw. Finally, in the 50's of the fifth century, the treasury of the League was transferred to Athens and the transition from League to Empire was complete. That the funds collected from League members contributed materially to the prosperity of Athens during the Periclean Age cannot be doubted. But the ruthlessness of the Athenians in converting the League into an Empire left an inheritance of bitterness which greatly hampered her in the long struggle with Sparta and her allies in the Peloponnesian War. Here again we may find a lesson for all empire builders.

After the defeat of Athens in 404, the early fourth century witnessed a period of "Spartan supremacy" (to 371), then a nine-year "Theban supremacy" and then, with the accession of Philip of Macedon in 359, began the long struggle of the Greek states against the aggressive policy of expansion initiated by the king. The subjugation of Greece by Philip presents striking similarities to the conduct of the Axis powers in the present war. In Macedonia the kingship had survived with the royal prerogatives unimpaired. Philip was an absolute ruler, in command of all the resources of the state. The Greek democracies, unable as always to unite, were further hampered by the fact that their armies were no longer made up of citizens, as had been the case in the fifth century, but were largely mercenary forces. Philip was a master of diplomacy and used liberal bribes to win adherents in the Greek cities. These "fifth columnists" followed the pattern so fa-

miliar in our own day, sometimes emphasizing the hopelessness of resistance, sometimes the benevolent purposes of the Macedonian king.

Early in his career Philip conceived the plan of uniting all Greece for a grand attack on the Persian Empire, such as was later carried out by his son Alexander. Not a few modern historians have maintained that the Greeks would have been wiser to submit to the Macedonian and join with him wholeheartedly in his grandiose scheme. That they did resist can be attributed only to their love of freedom. As usual, we are better informed about the course of Athens than about that of the other states. At Athens the orator Demosthenes led the opposition and the four speeches in which he tried to arouse the Athenians to a sense of their danger have given the word "philippic" its modern connotation. Many passages in these speeches remind us of modern conditions before and after the outbreak of the present war. Consider a passage in the Fourth Philippic:

The causes of our present difficulties are many and of long standing; if it is your wish I will recount them. You Athenians have abandoned the principles handed down by your fathers and have been persuaded by the politicians who hold those views that to take the leadership of the Greeks, to maintain a standing force and assist all who are unjustly treated is useless labor and vain expense; you believe that to live quietly and neglect your duties, while you give up one thing after another and allow others to seize on everything, brings marvelous prosperity and great security.

What better definition of "isolationism" can be found anywhere?

Again in the Third Philippic, Demosthenes warns the Athenians in words that might well be applied to the United States in the pre-war period:

But we look without concern on the man's increasing strength, each determined, so at least it seems to me, to count that time a gain in which another is destroyed; not considering or planning how Greece may be saved. For everyone knows that Philip is just like an epidemic or a fever, which, however distant it may now seem to be, ultimately overtakes us.

When Demosthenes inveighs against Philip's attitude toward the Greek states, we are irresistibly reminded of Hitler:

For you see, Athenians, how far the man has gone in arrogance. He gives you not even a choice of engaging him actively or keeping quiet, but uses threats, and, they say, makes outrageous speeches. Incapable of resting content with what he has conquered, he is always trying to add to his possessions and spreads his net about us on every side while we dally and sit still.

And finally, the rumormongers of Athens were clearly no different from the rumormongers of today:

As for you, some circulate rumors that Philip is negotiating with the Spartans for the humiliation of the Thebans and the dissolution of the free cities; others, that he has sent ambassadors to the King of Persia; others, that he is fortifying cities among the Illyrians; and others of us go about inventing stories as each one chooses. But I believe, Athenians, as god is my witness,

that he is drunk with the greatness of his achievements and dreams of many such actions in imagination, since he sees the complete lack of opponents and is exhilarated by what he has done. But most certainly I do not believe he chooses to act so that the silliest of us knows what he is going to do; for the rumormongers are the silliest of us all.

By such arguments Demosthenes at last roused the Athenians to vigorous action. An allied army of Boeotians and Athenians met Philip at Chaeronea in 338 B.C. The allies were utterly defeated and all Greece submitted to the rule of Macedonia. It is undoubtedly true that Demosthenes in his efforts to arouse the Athenians often made exaggerated statements to enforce his points. And it seems to be true that Philip, because of the leading role which Athens had played in earlier times and the strength of her fleet, honestly desired the cooperation of the Athenians. But no one can read Demosthenes' impassioned speeches without feeling that he was leading the fight for freedom and carrying on the tradition that had made Athens great.

That the great tradition still lives in Greece the events of the past three years have clearly shown. The significance of the valiant struggle of the Greeks against Axis aggression can hardly be overestimated. On the material side Greek resistance delayed the extension of Axis rule to the Eastern Mediterranean; it exploded the myth of the military might of Italy; and above all, it forced the Germans to waste precious months in the Spring of 1941, thus holding up the attack on Russia and contributing materially to the failure of that attack.

On the moral side also the importance of the Greek resistance was very great. At a time when one nation after another was yielding to the Axis — France signing an armistice, Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria bowing before the conqueror — Greece and the Yugoslav people alone stood firm against aggression and tyranny and opposed the new order of slavery in Europe. Greece's fight for freedom thrilled the friends of democracy throughout the world. She raised a voice that strengthened the faith of all peoples in the cause of liberty. She made it clear that the struggle was not one between the British Empire and a German Empire, but for the cause of freedom and against the deadly threat to our common inheritance of justice, liberty and Christian civilization. It may truly be said that the triumphs of her defenders and their self-sacrifice gave more than anything else the moral tone to the war unleashed on the world by the totalitarian powers.

GEORGE H. CHASE

GREECE AND THE GREEKS OF TODAY

ABOUT A CENTURY ago, Professor Fallmerayer, with characteristic German thoroughness, essayed to prove that all connection between the Greeks of today and their ancestors of the great Classical period had been broken during the Middle Ages and that the successive waves of barbarians, Avars, Bulgars, Slavs, Albanians, Turks, and the various Latin invaders have so mixed the population that no trace of the ancient blood remains. Fallmerayer was one of the pioneers in the investigation of "race-purity," which has been so relentlessly and one-sidedly pursued ever since by the Germans.

Similar proofs obtained by the same methods can be brought forward to witness against the purity of most of the national strains in Europe today. There is no such thing as race purity. But there are racial characteristics that are passed down through the ages that are independent of blood transmission, so that it is possible to find in Greece to-day a male profile of the type of the Hermes of Praxiteles, or a female figure with the form and carriage of a figure on an ancient vase.

Many of their customs, beliefs and observances have remained unchanged over the years. In independence of thought and freedom of expression they share the characteristics of the ancients. The spirit of ancient Greece is not dead. It survives not only in her immortal art and literature, in the masterpieces of modern literatures influenced by it, in the governmental principles of modern states, but also in her own living children, speaking the same language and governed by the same passions and occupied by the same pursuits as in the days of Pericles or Paul.*

One of the most fascinating of studies is to seek and to find in the Greece of today the Hellas of antiquity; those who live long enough in Greece to know and understand the land and people do find it. The feeling that the heroism of the ancient defenders of Hellas was still living among us became general recently when the news of the heroic fight of the Greeks against the Axis powers spread abroad, a fight characterized by Mr. Lincoln McVeagh, American minister to Greece, as "a magnificent struggle against crushing odds." "No chapter in all Greek annals," he adds, "not excepting even Thermopylae itself, outshone in glory the defense of the northern forts" against the German invaders.

The Greek people have never lost their love of freedom through the ages, nor the consciousness of the Hellenic idea. The nation has survived through all the vicissitudes of its long history, at one time resisting absorption by powerful empires, at another absorbing alien elements without the loss of its ideals. The spirit in which the Greeks met the recent crisis was worthy of the highest traditions of the country.

* Quoted from Walter Miller. *Greece and the Greeks*, 1941.

Modern Greece has barely completed a century of free and independent life. For nearly four centuries, from the fall of Constantinople before the Ottoman Turks, to the end of the War of Independence in 1830 the country was in slavery to the Moslems. In 1821 Greece joined in the general movement then prevalent among the small countries to obtain their freedom from the mother country or from despotism, an example set by the United States of America, which Greece was the first to follow in Europe. Indeed, when the Greeks revolted, in 1821, popular liberty and democracy were very much under the ban of the Holy Alliance of the Kings of Europe. The revolt of the Greeks against an old constituted authority like the Ottoman Empire was an extremely bad example to other small peoples. Had the great Powers not thought that the Sultan's troops would quickly have ended the insurrection, they would probably have taken steps themselves to quell it. But their expectations were foiled because of Greek love of liberty which showed its worth over numbers and power.

At the outset of the Greek War of Independence, the young American Republic was the first government to open its heart to the struggling country. Its leaders as well as its people greeted the Greek revolt with enthusiasm, as their descendants were to do over a hundred years later, in 1940. Then the liberals in the countries of Europe flocked to the Greek standards. This was the era of the great Philhellenes, Lord Byron notably, and Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, to say nothing of famous French, Germans and Italians who rallied to the cause of liberty.

The Greek struggle for freedom in 1821 produced moral effects throughout the world as her resistance to Axis aggression was to do later in 1940. Under the impetus to liberalism and democracy released by the Greek revolution, Great Britain refused to help the King of Spain against his revolting subjects and against its insurgent colonies in Latin America; President Monroe was able to issue his famous declaration that started the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere; the French rose against Charles X and expelled him; Belgium gained its independence; Poland rose against the Tsars; and the Italian struggle for independence was fanned to life again. Before long the Holy Alliance came to an end and the liberal movement spread all over Europe.

For another reason the Greek War of Independence belongs to the history of humanity as much as to the history of Greece. It was a popular movement. There were no recognized leaders, no military preparations, no resources for battle with a powerful empire. The real power behind the movement was the unquenchable desire for freedom, the hatred of slavery and the ever-living tradition of the Greek spirit.

After a long struggle of eight bloody years, years filled with incidents and romance that arouse the interest of readers and hearers to-day as they stirred the enthusiasm of the philhellenes of those days, the Greeks set free a corner of their land and secured their independent existence. Six hundred and fifty thousand out of eight million Greeks in the Ottoman Empire had freed for themselves after a destructive eight years' war a barren corner

of Europe, four-fifths of which consisted of rocks and mountains, and the rest filled with ruins. To the Greeks this was only a beginning of the redemption of their territory, and the struggle to complete that redemption went on until 1922.

From February 3, 1830, the date of the Protocol of London which recognized Greek independence, to the present day, the political development of Greece has been painful, and the government of the country can hardly be said yet to have passed its period of adolescence. This is not surprising to one who views the political situation in the light of the historic and political background. During the period of the Revolution, the Greeks had held congresses and conventions at various times and had always voted for a republican regime. But the great powers, always suspicious of the establishment of a republic and doubtful of the ability of the people to govern themselves, imposed on the newly liberated country the rule of a monarchy and sent down the young Bavarian Prince Otto to become Otho I, King of the Hellenes. Filled with the traditional ideas of the divine rights of kingship, and failing utterly to understand the character of the Greeks, Otho attempted to impose his personal rule on them, surrounded by a crowd of German advisers, and excluding Greeks as much as possible from participation in the Government. After a turbulent reign, he was deposed in 1862.

The following year he was succeeded by George I, a Danish prince, brother of Queen Alexandra of England. He reigned for fifty years and made a genuine and quite successful attempt to win the affection of the Greek people and to understand their character and way of life. During his reign Greece was enlarged by the cession of the Ionian Islands by Britain in 1864 and by the acquisition of Thessaly in 1881, and Epirus, Macedonia and the Aegean Islands in 1912-1913.

After the first World War and by 1922-1923, the population of Greece was suddenly increased through an exchange of populations between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. Never has a country had to face the problem presented to the Greeks in 1922. Greece is a country a little less in size than the combined areas of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont, with a warmer climate, but much less fertility and a much rougher surface. Into this small area were suddenly introduced a million and a half refugees to be taken care of by the population. Greece performed the seeming miracle in the space of a few years, aided by the cooperation of American philanthropic institutions.

It seems absurd to make a comparison between the achievement of the United States with its almost boundless resources and that of Greece, in the period of the last hundred and ten years. However, leaving out the matter of natural resources and the immense contrast which they involve, there are some other interesting parallels and contrasts between the two countries.

First, the United States, once its independence was gained, continued its evolution with individualism as its moving force. The purpose was to pro-

tect the rights and interests of the individual citizen and the free development of his genius as against encroachments by the State. In Greece the *raison d'être* of the independent state was not the welfare of her citizens, but the liberation of the much larger irredenta beyond her borders from alien rule. Accordingly, the tendency was to strengthen the state at the expense of the individual citizen, because the state was the instrument for the realization of the national aim for the redemption of the enslaved Greeks.

Second, the United States broke its relations with the past and looked chiefly toward the future. For the Greeks, the past was over-powerful. The consciousness of distinctiveness and superiority, reared upon the glory of classical Greece and the grandeur of the Byzantine Empire affected Greece's actions and policies. The past was an element of force for the Greeks, but also a source of weakness, as it thwarted creative energy.

Third, the fundamental policy of the Greek people for the liberation of the unredeemed Greeks, known as the policy of the "Great Idea," was much more difficult of attainment than the policy of "Manifest Destiny" for the United States. The American people had to fight for the conquest of the American continent against natural obstacles only. The Greeks had to fight against human obstacles: the conflicting interests of the great Powers of Europe, the might of the Ottoman Empire, the jealousies of neighbors.

Fourth, America found its salvation in non-intervention in Europe and avoidance of European alliances. Greece was compelled to seek unceasingly through European diplomacy to accomplish its national aim.

Lastly, the attachment of the American people to democratic ideals was an element of force for the United States. For the Greeks the same attachment made more difficult its struggle which required uniqueness of direction, methodical effort and a strong Executive.

Add to the above the fact that Greece is and has always been a country poor in natural resources and the handicaps under which its people have labored during the past century of Greek history will be readily understood.

Yet, no other country is so fundamentally akin to Greece as the United States. The Greek people are a classless society as are the people of America and their attachment to the idea of democracy is as powerful and deep as in this country. Freedom of thought, speech and religion are of the essence of the Greek spirit. Greece has been a melting pot of races and foreign elements during all her long history and has absorbed these elements in the same way as America has done, by tolerance, infusion of its traditions and blending together of the elements of culture. This has kept Greece strong and perpetually young exactly as the same process is strengthening America.

As soon as Greece was treacherously attacked by Mussolini on October 28, 1940, the wholehearted sympathy of the American people went out to her. This was not merely the natural impulse of a people prone always to

sympathize with the weak nation when it is attacked by a strong and ruthless aggressor; nor was it simply the admiration for a little nation that dared to resist the Axis. It was also the traditional friendship of the American people for Greece. When the Greeks not only resisted aggression but started to inflict defeats on the Fascists and to expel them from their territory the Americans saw in the Greek victories a revival of the old spirit and love for freedom that saved civilization in earlier times, and recalled the great Greek victories of the past, Marathon, Salamis, Navarino.

The reaction of present-day America is closely parallel to the reaction of the American people in 1821 when the Greek people revolted against the Ottoman Empire and fought for freedom. The tradition of philhellenism in America dates from that time. The student of the records beginning with the end of 1821 will be struck by the feelings expressed at that time by the American people. It is interesting to review here the highlights of the American reaction to the Greek fight in 1821. The first news of the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire reached this country in May 1821, and before long enthusiasm was so spread that even the strange-sounding Greek name of Ypsilanti, a Greek General, was given to a town on the American frontier. Interest heightened later when reports reached here that the Greeks had established a Federal Constitution and had elected senators and representatives. Soon after word of the first spectacular naval victory of the Greeks reached America. This and subsequent news from Greece stirred the American people to seek ways and means of giving aid to the cause of Greek freedom. Appeals were published in the principal American newspapers. Edward Everett and Daniel Webster wrote enthusiastic articles. President Monroe in his Message to Congress of December 4, 1822 gave expression to the feelings of the American people when he wrote:

The name of Greece fills the mind and the heart with the highest and noblest sentiments. Superior skill and refinement in arts, heroic gallantry in action, disinterested patriotism, enthusiastic zeal and devotion to liberty are connected with our memories of old Greece. The disappearance of this country for a long time under an aggressive dark yoke has profoundly grieved the generous spirits of the past; it was therefore natural for the reappearance of this people in its original character, fighting for its liberty, to arouse the enthusiasm and sympathy everywhere in the United States.

Proposals for financial and even military help to Greece came before Congress. Committees for Aid to Greece were organized all over the United States and appeals for funds were issued by these Committees in every state of the Union. In New York, William Bayard, in Boston, Thomas Winthrop and Edward Everett, in Philadelphia Bishop White took the initiative and direction of the efforts for financial assistance to Greece. High masses were celebrated in Churches for the success of the Greek Army. Balls were organized in many cities. In New York alone 2000 tickets at \$5.00 each were sold for one Ball for relief to Greece. Medical supplies and clothing and foodstuffs were collected and ships were chartered which

transported these necessities to Greece. American interest in and sympathy for Greece took other forms as well. During and after the war orphan Greek children were adopted by Americans and brought to the United States. Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe of Boston is an outstanding example of an American whose devotion to Greece during and after the Greek War of Independence has endeared him to the Greek people.

The Greeks feel a profound gratitude to the American people for their manifold assistance in that hour of hard struggle against tremendous odds, and they feel a similar gratitude today. They have always looked to America for sympathetic understanding in difficult times. For they know that America has always been the depository of the traditions of freedom and democracy that constitute the Greek cultural heritage. Love of liberty of thought and speech; attachment to the idea of democracy; urge for learning; devotion to God and the scientific spirit — these are the immortal spiritual forces of the Greek cultural heritage and in no country are these forces in higher development than in America.

As is well known, in the last war the first knock-out blow was delivered against the Central Powers on the Macedonian front. Greece's part in this victory was important. By the middle of 1918 a powerful Greek army of 250,000 men with ample reserves began its advance at the side of French, Italian and British troops. It was the presence of the Greek army that made the victory possible and their fellow allies were not slow to acknowledge this fact. The military consequences of this victory were decisive. Turkey was cut off from the Central Powers. The Austro-Hungarians were threatened with attack from the south-east. Von Hindenburg admitted that the collapse in Macedonia was one of the causes that excluded all hope of forcing the Entente to make peace. It was not long before an armistice was concluded with Turkey (October 30) and on the Western Front (November 11).

At the Peace Conference, Greece presented claims for the unredeemed parts of the Hellenic world: Thrace, Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese Islands and Smyrna with the adjoining coast of Asia Minor. The Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 granted most of these claims. However, the Turkish National Movement and the assistance given to it by Greece's erstwhile Allies, Italy and France, caused the Asia Minor campaign in which Greece alone was engaged against Turkey to be doomed from the first. The result was a military catastrophe for the Greeks and the expulsion of the Greek population from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. The ensuing Treaty of Lausanne destroyed the largest part of the gains obtained by the Treaty of Sèvres.

Greece swallowed her disappointment. Mr. Eleutherios Venizelos, the great Greek leader, assumed the government in July 1928. In the succeeding four years of his term as Prime Minister, the foundations of Greece's foreign and domestic policy were laid down. He, who was the embodiment of the "Great Idea" foreign policy of Greece for the liberation of all Greek lands, was able to convince the Greek people that it should now

be definitely abandoned since Greece, through the exchange of minorities with Turkey and Bulgaria, had received within its borders the bulk of Hellenism and that the national ideal should now be the strengthening of the State, the prosperity of the people and the development of culture. In execution of this policy the establishment of a true understanding and friendship with Turkey was inaugurated in 1930, a policy pursued by successive Greek governments with great success.

At the same time, Greece initiated the idea of a Balkan Entente by calling the first Balkan Conference at Athens in 1930. This was the first time that representatives of the six countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Turkey and Greece were brought together in a friendly atmosphere and the spirit of friendly cooperation was established. Greece labored assiduously in the succeeding years to the beginning of World War II for the establishment of a real Balkan bloc of peace and cooperation. She was assisted in this effort loyally by Turkey, Yugoslavia and Rumania. However, Bulgaria refused to cooperate in the political field as she would not give up her ambitions for territorial expansion, and Albania under Italian influence was not a free agent. The rest is recent history.

During the long years of domination of Greece by the Ottomans, the cultural tradition of the Greeks remained alive. As the dominant Oriental power suppressed literary and artistic endeavor, the Greek spirit found expression in popular art, especially folk songs, dances, handicraft and religious painting. With the independence of Greece in 1830, literary and artistic creative work begins. Her leading writers, artists and scholars drew their inspiration from the West. The ambition was to recreate the classical era and they felt that by imitating the Western models they would reach this goal more easily since the West was now the depository of Greek culture.

With this purpose in mind, they created an artificial language of the purists following the pattern of ancient Greek. A minority of literary men and artists, however, felt that this was a fatal error. They urged that the inspiration should be sought in the rich treasures of the popular tradition as this was the true and only basis of creating a real culture derived from the living forces of the people. They rejected the artificial language of the purists and used the idiom spoken by the common people as more genuinely Greek and as expressing the genius of the Greeks.

The struggle between the "purist" or archaistic and the "popular" or "demotic" tradition went on for over half a century. The latter received a powerful impetus in 1888 with the appearance of "My Voyage," a novel by Jean Psicharis, a Greek Professor at the University of Sorbonne in Paris, written in the popular language. His book was the manifesto for a living language of a living people, who, although conscious of the precious cultural heritage of their ancestors hoped to equal it by creating their own, a new culture.

Vigorously attacked by many and passionately defended by a small number of enlightened spirits for four decades, the new gospel came gradually

to find almost universal support so that today the popular tradition has been generally the moving force of Greek letters. This has also changed the general outlook of Greeks, and the past has ceased to overpower their creative spirit. During the last century great Greek writers and artists were born in Greece. Some found in Western Europe the necessary medium for their expression, just as El Greco during the Ottoman domination in Greece created his incomparable paintings in Spain. The great French language poet, Jean Moreas, is a Greek who found in France the locale for his genius. So did the painter Guizis, in Germany. Many others followed their example.

Other equally eminent poets and writers stayed in Greece and created great art in a language which made their work mostly unknown to Western peoples. Such was the poet Kostis Palamas, the greatest literary figure in modern Greece, who died recently in Greece, deeply mourned, at the age of eighty-two.

In the field of prose, Alexander Papadiamantis was the leading story writer, during the last generation. He wrote especially of the life of the people of the Greek islands with a deep understanding of their character and life, in an incomparable style. In the post-war period, the greatest Greek novelists are Stratis Myrivilis and Elias Venezis. The former's "Life in the Tomb" (the diary of a soldier at the front) and the latter's "Register No. 31218" (the description of the personal experiences of captivity in Asia Minor) are books that can stand side by side with Remarque's "All Quiet on the Western Front" or Sherif's "Journey's End."

Cultured Greeks are as a rule polyglots, and American, English, French and Italian literatures are known in Greece both in the original and in Greek translations. Among the American writers whose work has been translated into Greek one may mention Sherwood Anderson, Pearl S. Buck, Sinclair Lewis, William Faulkner, Archibald MacLeish, T. S. Eliot, William Saroyan, Henry Miller and Erskine Caldwell.

The accomplishments of modern Greece in music are also noteworthy. Dimitri Mitropoulos, the eminent conductor of the Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra is one of the leading conductors of the present day. It is thanks to him that the 72-year-old symphony orchestra of the Athens Conservatory — the foremost musical institution of Greece which was founded in 1871 — became one of the best in Europe.

With the expansion of the local tourist facilities in Greece, a new phase of musical life developed in recent years. In September 1935, Mitropoulos conducted an all-Beethoven concert in the famous Epidaurus Theatre, followed in 1936 by festivals in the Old Corinth, Sikyon and Delphi Theaters. A regular summer season was established at that time with symphony concerts at the Odeion of Herodes Atticus (under the Acropolis). In that unique auditorium, the Royal Theatre Company was presenting every summer modern Greek versions of tragedies by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. Mitropoulos wrote the music to two of them — "Electra" and "Hippolytus."

Apart from the Hymn to Apollo, discovered by Reinach in Delphi some

years ago, and a few other musical texts, there are no records on which to form a satisfactory idea of how ancient Greek music sounded. The principles of ancient musical theory have come down to our times thanks to the treatises of Aristoxenos and other theorists, but it is not possible to speak with any certainty of the relationship between ancient and modern Greek music. There are, however, numerous evidences of the survival of elements of ancient Greek music in the Byzantine chants of the Greek Orthodox Church and in the folk-songs of the mountain regions of Rumeli and Epirus, as well as of some islands, where the spirit of the race has remained comparatively untouched by outside influences.

The American public has not yet become familiar with contemporary Greek music, the reason being that for the most part this remains still unpublished. With the presence, however, in the United States of Dimitri Mitropoulos, it is to be hoped that in a not too remote future the most representative creations of modern Greek composers will find their place in the programs of symphony or other concerts of this country and that music lovers in Athens will also become acquainted with contemporary American music, as soon as circumstances will again be favorable in Greece for undertakings of this nature.

In the realm of sculpture, architecture and painting there are great masters among the modern Greeks. It would take long even to sketch the work of such men as Halepas, the genius of Tinos, of Tombros, of Apartis, Parthenis and many others.

In science, the Greeks have done significant work, but they have been handicapped by the lack of resources for equipping laboratories. When this was not a handicap, the Greek spirit found eminent expression. Constantinos Caratheodory of Munich and Athens is one of the greatest living mathematicians of the world. The writer can testify personally to the skill of Greek surgeons, and to the excellence of hospitals in Athens. Nicholas Politis, who died a year ago, was by far the leading international jurist. The late A. Andreades was one of the great economic theorists of the world. They have left successors in these fields.

Thus, the Greek people have added their share in the creative work of the world and have more than deserved the freedom which they so valiantly defended against the Axis aggressors. It is believed that with the uplifting of the spirit of the people through their great battle for freedom and the release of moral forces consequent thereto, there should come a brilliant cultural development in post-war Greece as in other similar stages in Greek history. Greece will need, however, material assistance for the reconstruction of her schools and libraries and the restoration of her scientific and university laboratories that have been destroyed by the enemy. She may count on complete restitution by the defeated invaders of her soil and on help by the United States and the other United Nations.

As Thomas Mann said, "Our admiration for the Greek defense may not be expressed in words alone. Greece has a right to deeds." And our Minister at Athens, Lincoln MacVeagh, was able to say on his return from Greece

after her occupation by the German invaders: "When this war is over and Greece receives her freedom, she will have paid for it with blood and tears . . . I believe that if America has anything to say about it, her reward will be commensurate with her sacrifice. On my return to Washington, I inquired of a high official what I might say of the government's sympathy with Greece, and the reply was, 'Go the limit,' and so I do."

Indeed, the valiant struggle of Greece against aggression and the heroic sacrifice of her people have again placed civilization under indebtedness. Out of the present struggle there should issue a better world. When that happens, the Greeks of today, as their forebears, will stand in the bright light of history.

SHIRLEY H. WEBER

GREECE AND HER NEIGHBORS

AT THE DARKEST hour of the Battle of Britain, in the fall of 1940, small Greece opened a second front in Europe with her valiant fight against the Fascist aggression. Against overwhelming odds she also resisted the Nazi invasion in April 1941. Her determination to fight rather than surrender was dictated by her traditions and her passionate attachment to freedom.

When this war is over and Greece again receives her freedom, she will have paid for it an immense sacrifice in blood, starvation, death and destruction — a crushing human and physical disaster. Her people will hope for assistance by their friends but will demand no more than the recovery of their national inheritance. The Greeks desire a sound and lasting peace and security for their State.

At the outbreak of the present war, Greece was in the fortunate position of having gathered within her borders the bulk of the Greek nation — a consummation of a century of tragic struggles involved in her effort to liberate the irredenta parts of Hellenism. After her military disaster in Asia Minor, the entire Greek population under Turkish rule in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace was driven out. Under the Lausanne Convention of 1923 for the exchange of populations with Turkey, a million and a half of these Greeks were settled in Greece and all Moslems in Greece, outside those in Western Thrace, were compelled to leave for Turkey. About 360,000 Turks left Greece between 1923 and 1925 and if we add to these those that emigrated to Turkey from 1912 to 1922, the total reaches about half a million. On the other hand, under the convention for reciprocal emigration of 1919 between Greece and Bulgaria, an exchange of minorities of the two countries took place with the result that all Greeks in Bulgaria emigrated to Greece and the largest part of the Bulgarians in Greece moved to Bulgaria.

The result of these two movements of population was to make of Greece a homogeneous country. The League of Nations' publication, *Greek Refugees Settlement* (Geneva 1926) shows the change in the following picture of Macedonia in 1912 and 1926:

	1912		1926	
	Population	%	Population	%
Greeks	513,000	42.6	1,341,000	88.8
Moslems	475,000	39.4	2,000	0.1
Bulgarians	119,000	9.9	77,000	5.1
Miscellaneous	98,000	8.1	91,000	6.0
	<hr/> 1,205,000	<hr/> 100.0	<hr/> 1,511,000	<hr/> 100.0

With regard to the whole of Greece, the ethnological changes wrought by the exchange of populations and the refugee settlement are shown in

the following table given by the International Refugee Settlement Commission:

	1920		1928	
	<i>Population</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>%</i>
Greeks	4,470,000	80.75	5,822,000	93.83
Turks	770,000	13.91	103,000	1.66
Bulgarians	139,000	2.51	82,000	1.32
Albanians	18,000	0.32	20,000	0.32
Jews	65,000	1.17	70,000	1.13
Armenians	1,000	0.02	35,000	0.56
Foreign citizens	73,000	1.32	73,000	1.18
	<hr/> 5,536,000	<hr/> 100.00	<hr/> 6,205,000	<hr/> 100.00

The Turks are located in Western Thrace which was excluded from the exchange as a counterpart of the exemption of Greeks in Constantinople. The Jews are mainly centered in the City of Saloniki. The Bulgarians are found only in Western and Central Macedonia, far from the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. There are no Bulgarians left in Western Thrace.

The absorption of the refugees by Greece is a feat perhaps unique in history. It may be visualized if one can imagine the analogy of a sudden arrival on the shores of the United States of thirty million people who must be fed, housed, clothed and put to productive employment within a short period of time. For it must not be forgotten that this was not an orderly emigration but a movement of a widespread exodus of people leaving everything behind them and reaching Greece destitute and starving. The sufferings of the Greek population driven out from Turkey within the space of a few weeks were cruel beyond measure. Tens of thousands perished in this flight from Turkey and as a result of it. Indeed, the emigration of Greeks from Turkey was practically completed when the Convention was signed at Lausanne in 1923, while the bulk of the Moslems left Greece through the care of the International Mixed Commission after 1923 and the same is true of the Greco-Bulgarian movement of emigration under the auspices of another Mixed Commission.

Now, at a distance of nearly twenty years, these sufferings are thrown into oblivion and we only see the strength and stability that the refugee settlement has given to Greece and the economic development and progress of the country under the impetus of its new population. However, the expulsion of these unhappy people from Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia by the Bulgarian satellites of the Axis after 1941 in their attempt to de-Hellenize these sections of Greece brings to mind again the sad plight and the tragedy of these old refugees, now once more refugees in the starving sections of southern Greece.

When all this movement of populations was completed in the late twenties, the Greek people swallowed their disappointment at the unhappy outcome of the Asia Minor enterprise. Bringing to an end generations of en-

mity with Turkey, they concluded a treaty of alliance with this country and established cordial relations with her on such solid foundations that they have outlasted the present tragedy of Greece.

At the same time Greece called in 1930 the first Balkan Conference in Athens and thereby initiated the whole movement for a Balkan Union and worked assiduously to establish this Union. Its accomplishment, which would have served as a substantial guarantee for the independence and integrity of its component states at a time when anarchy was gradually taking the place of law in Europe, was unhappily prevented by the obstinate obstruction and refusal to cooperate on the part of Bulgaria, which all along was obeying the dictates of Germany and Italy, and the non-coöperation of the Italian protectorate of Albania.

There is no doubt that when victory is won and her freedom restored Greece will once again work for a Balkan federation. She has already initiated this work with her London Agreement with Yugoslavia of January 15, 1942, concerning the constitution of a Balkan Union. This contains a charter of a Balkan Union to which the two countries hope other Balkan states will adhere.

The preamble of this Agreement is eloquent:

Having observed past experience, and more particularly recent experiences, which have demonstrated that a lack of close understanding between the Balkan peoples has caused them to be exploited by the powers of aggression in their aim toward political and military penetration and domination of the peninsula, and considering that in order to assure the independence and peace of the Balkan States the fundamental principles of their policy must be the principle of "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples" . . .

The Agreement provides for three forms of coöperation among Balkan countries: economic and financial through an Economic and Financial Organ constituted by two members of each government with the task of coördinating the policies of exterior commerce, concluding a customs union, elaborating a common economic plan and improving communications between the member countries, and instituting a Balkan monetary union; political coöperation through a Political Organ constituted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member States with the task of coördinating foreign policy, establishing arbitration, intellectual coöperation, coördinating public opinion and defense of common interests; and military coöperation through a Permanent Military Organ constituting a common general staff of the national armies. A Permanent Bureau of the Union is also provided for and collaboration between Parliaments through regular meetings permitting deliberation on questions of common interest.

The Agreement was very favorably received in Turkey and there is hardly any doubt that Turkey will adhere to it at the end of the war. It is the kind of a Balkan Union which Turkey had long worked for with Greece prior to the outbreak of this war. We need only discuss the position of the other two neighbors of Greece, Bulgaria and Albania.

Relations with Bulgaria

It is hoped that at the end of the war there may be a regenerated Bulgaria willing to coöperate with the other Balkan peoples. She will, of course, be expelled from the Greek provinces of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace which she occupied during this war as a prize for her treachery and her assistance to the Axis. She must give restitution for the crimes she committed during this occupation. The British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Richard K. Law, properly declared before Parliament on March 24:

The Bulgarian Government is making systematic attempts to nationalize this territory and many inhabitants are being expelled to make room for Bulgarian immigrants. The British Government regards as null and void any legislation or other acts by the Bulgarian Government which are aimed at Bulgarizing Greek territory, which they covet. All these measures of expropriation, for which the Bulgarian Government must be held responsible, will have to be undone at the end of the war.

When this is done, Greece will be ready to show generosity to Bulgaria. She does not aspire to any Bulgarian territory and prefers to resume friendly relations. Before the war Greece had acquired a position of considerable importance as a market for Bulgarian exports. She purchased foodstuffs, livestock, coal and other commodities from Bulgaria. It is hoped that the problem of transportation between the two countries may be finally settled. The linking of the Bulgarian and Greek railway systems is technically a simple matter. Greece has repeatedly suggested this linking but Bulgaria has refused. The pre-war situation was really absurd. For example, as Mr. Pasvolksy pointed out, "Bulgarian coal intended for the Greek market is mined in a section of the country which is not far from the Greek frontier. Yet, in the absence of a direct railway line connecting the two countries, the shipments of coal are carried by rail to the Black Sea and dispatched by water from Burgas to Saloniki.

But no real rapprochement will be accomplished between the two countries unless Bulgaria honestly and definitely abandons her political ambitions for Greek territory. She has absolutely no justification for such ambitions. The small Bulgarian minority in Greece (82,000 people among seven million Greeks) is far from the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. This minority was given the opportunity to emigrate to Bulgaria under the Reciprocal Emigration Convention of 1919 but preferred to remain in Greece. They are peaceful rural people attached to their soil and chose to live on their land. They have given no trouble to Greece. The so-called Macedonian movement fostered by the Bulgarian leaders openly or secretly, a murderous organization, could be stamped out by Bulgaria if she made an honest effort to suppress it. The truth is that Bulgaria, notwithstanding crushing defeats in 1913 and in 1918, has not learned her lesson that she must give up the foolish dream of a great Bulgaria opened before her eyes temporarily by the short-lived Russo-Turkish treaty of San Stefano of 1878, which was

superseded by the Treaty of Berlin. Her stupid aspirations caused her to be drawn into the orbit of the Central Powers in 1915 and again to side with the Axis in 1941.

During the hectic period between World War I and the present War Bulgaria openly claimed a territorial outlet to the Aegean through the eastern frontier of Western Thrace where Greek territory adjoins the Turkish territory of Eastern Thrace. During the period 1919-1939 Bulgarian statesmen voiced their disapproval of the Treaty of Neuilly in depriving Bulgaria of this outlet.

If one can piece together their allegations for the need of such an outlet, the argument runs as follows: The Danube River could not be relied upon as an avenue for transportation for Bulgaria because it was not navigable all the year round; the two large Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea — Varna and Burgas, the first 143 and the second 120 miles from the Bosphorus — were useless as an outlet because Turkey controlled the Straits; the Aegean port Dedeagatch should revert to Bulgaria since it belonged to it geographically and hence commercially; Bulgaria's economic activity is seriously impaired without an outlet to the Aegean Sea.

Now what are the real facts on these allegations? The freezing of the lower Danube has never in the past presented an insurmountable obstacle in the movement of trade. Bulgarian policy has caused the river to be unfit for navigation at some points, for it has regarded it as a military frontier rather than as a commercial route. The best proof of this is that only a few years ago Bulgaria allowed a bridge to be built over the Danube to Rumania. Her military leaders long objected to its construction. The Danube River has long been one of the busiest routes of Central Europe. For practical purposes it is navigable the year round, since it is comparatively simple and inexpensive to keep the shipping lanes open and have the harbors dredged.

The argument that Bulgaria's two large ports, Varna and Burgas on the Black Sea, are useless because of Turkey's control of the Bosphorus carries little weight. It is common knowledge that the Straits are open to international commercial shipping as provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This freedom of passage to commercial ships of foreign nations was again guaranteed for the second time by the Convention of Montreaux. No one can believe this Bulgarian allegation when Rumania and Soviet Russia, much more important countries, can get along with their Black Sea ports and have never alleged that these ports are useless to them because of Turkey's possession of the Straits.

The point that Dedeagatch, the Aegean port near the junction of the Greco-Turkish frontier, belongs geographically to Bulgaria is as far-fetched as it can be. Bulgaria was in possession of Western Thrace and of Dedeagatch from 1912 to 1918. Yet it never constructed a road or a railroad connection from this port to its hinterland. Nor did she even repair this port during that period. The simple truth is that the Black Sea outlets and the Danube ports sufficed for the commercial needs of the virtually self-suffi-

cient Bulgarian nation, as Hamilton Fish Armstrong has pointed out in his book "The New Balkans."

Bulgaria has never needed the Greek Aegean littoral to ensure the ingress and egress of her trade, as one will find amply demonstrated by consulting Leo Pasvol'sky's book on "Bulgaria's Economic Position." More than eighty percent of her population is engaged in agriculture. From the point of view of foodstuffs Bulgaria is one of the few virtually self-sufficient nations in Europe. In sharp contrast to Greece, Bulgaria exports foodstuffs. Cereals and their derivatives constitute 70% of her total exports. Livestock raising is also an important phase of Bulgaria's economy, and her resources in this respect are larger than Rumania's or Yugoslavia's. Livestock figures in ever increasing numbers in Bulgaria's foreign trade. Its products — tobacco, dairy produce, livestock and cereals — are largely exported to Central Europe. Even in the normal year 1928, before the dislocation of commerce in Europe, 50% of the exports moved to Austria, Germany, Italy and Hungary with an additional 8% to Greece and 4.7% to Turkey. Of the rest 5.5% went to France, 4.2% to Belgium and 1.9% to Great Britain.

Bulgaria's per capita imports are smaller than of any country in Europe, except Russia. Machinery, metal goods and war materials comprised the bulk of her imports and practically all of this came from Central Europe.

This condition of her foreign trade explains why most of it passed through Bulgaria's ten ports on the Danube and the rest through her eight ports on the Black Sea. Five of the river ports and two of the sea ports are served by railroads. Bulgaria's railway system runs east and west and not north and south. While under Bulgarian domination from 1912 to 1918, the Aegean coast line was not regarded, and indeed was not, an economic outlet. Bulgaria never bothered to connect it with her main railway system. If further proof is needed of the non-essentiality of sea routes for Bulgaria, it should be noted that as of June 30, 1939, her mercantile fleet was the smallest in the world, comprising 14 vessels of an aggregate tonnage of 17,476 tons.

There is therefore no doubt whatsoever that the Bulgarian pre-war claim for a territorial outlet to the Aegean had no economic foundation and is a naked political ambition for territorial expansion — an expansion, be it added, doubly injurious to Greece; it would have involved an ethnological sacrifice to Greece since it would mean ceding to Bulgaria a territory inhabited only by Greeks and Moslems. There was not one Bulgarian living before the war in Western Thrace, as all Bulgarians had moved to Bulgaria under the Convention for Reciprocal Emigration of Minorities. Secondly, it would have meant the elimination of the land frontier between Greece and Turkey, which both countries would never have consented to; and the recent history proves the wisdom of their determination to hold to a common frontier.

Greece, of course, never refused to give to Bulgaria an economic outlet to the Aegean, as distinguished from a territorial outlet. At the Lausanne Conference in 1923 Greece offered to Bulgaria a Free Zone at the port of Saloniki which would afford Bulgaria free transit of goods to and from the

country. It also declared itself ready to entrust to an international administration the port of Dedeagatch in Western Thrace together with the railway that connected it with Bulgaria by the round-about way through the Turkish city of Adrianople. It also offered to build up the facilities of the port and give all the necessary guarantees for the freedom of Bulgarian commerce. Bulgaria refused both offers. Several explanations were given. A Bulgarian author, Simeon Radeff, suggested that Bulgarian merchants could not feel at home in territory under Greek sovereignty! During the same period the Yugoslavs were enjoying Free Zone privileges in the Greek port of Saloniki, amply proving that such arrangements could be satisfactorily worked out by well-intentioned neighbors.

In a further attempt to satisfy Bulgarian demands, the Greek Government in October 1925 initiated direct negotiations with Sofia. The negotiations were under way when a new Free Zone was created in Saloniki for the purpose of giving the Balkan States, as the Greek Government explained, "and especially Bulgaria, access to the Aegean Sea, under regulations which will allow any country to use the port of Saloniki for the shipment of goods, incoming or outgoing, without restriction as to duties, rights of seizure or of search." Nothing ever came of this. Bulgaria remained adamant.

Having the advantage today of hindsight, it is not difficult to see the true nature of Bulgaria's demand for a territorial outlet to the Aegean. The last shadow of doubt was dispelled by the Bulgarian Premier, Mr. Bogden Filov, on November 19, 1941, in his speech to the National Assembly, when he said:

Bulgaria is a small nation, but, even so, her action without doubt wrecked the much-discussed plan of a Balkan *bloc*. It was because of Bulgaria's firm attitude that this *bloc* never materialized, and thus a scheme, the object of which was the formation of hundreds of divisions to fight against the Germans, was foiled. This fact emphatically proves that Bulgaria followed this policy in order to maintain harmony among the Axis Powers. Today we stand firmly at the side of the Axis.

Vice-President Wallace has laid down the direction for post-war planning. The world is to have "a second chance to organize its affairs on a basis of human decency and mutual welfare." Ambitions for self-aggrandizement cannot be permitted to triumph over the principle of human decency and mutual welfare. Bulgaria will be in an enviable position with her pre-war possessions. She has great economic resources and sea trade never was an economic necessity for her. Greece is not self-sufficient. Sea commerce is essential to her to feed and clothe her population. She needs every bit of her territory, especially in Western Thrace, where she has established Greek refugees from Asia Minor and where as a result of improved agricultural technique and new crops she has made of the district the bread-basket of her people and has helped minimize her food shortage, which has always been a serious problem. The occupation of Western Thrace and Eastern

Macedonia by Bulgaria from a prostrated Greece — as a reward for her joining the Axis — was a most cruel thing, for it deprived Greece of food she so badly needed and increased the starvation of her people.

The latest news from Greece is that with the retirement of the Italians from Macedonia, the whole of this region of Greece has now been occupied by Bulgaria. This undoubtedly means greater sufferings for the Greek people and shows once more the stupidity of the leaders of Bulgaria in attempting to satisfy their foolish ambition for Macedonia at a time when the Axis is crumbling.


Greece will undoubtedly demand that the problem of Bulgaria should be handled in such a way that she could not conceivably be a menace again to the peace in the Balkans. At the same time, Bulgaria must be required to make full reparation and restitution for atrocities and damages in the occupied provinces of Greece.

Relations with Albania

On frequent occasions it has been proposed that the solution of the Albanian question lies in the partition of that country between Greece and Yugoslavia. Yet Greeks would surely be reluctant today to accept such a division of Albania, since this would mean their annexing parts of Albania containing a large Albanian minority. This would destroy the condition of present Greece which has given to the country its greatest strength and stability — the homogeneity of its people. It is also thought that Greece would find it to her interest to have on its northern border an Albanian nation with which she might cultivate relations of real friendship. Much effort toward a rapprochement between the two peoples had already been made before the war, by private organizations in both countries. Albanian students entered the University of Athens and the Greek Military Schools. Commercial relations were progressively improving before the war. It would seem that the two countries have a community of interests and should work together for the preservation of peace and their economic advancement. Their economics are supplementary and not competing.

For such a solution the international security of a free and independent Albania is indispensable. The country will need for a considerable time outside assistance to reach this state. It is true that the people were devoid of cohesion and political experience and have long been an aggregate of tribes with inherited quarrels. Lack of education has prevented a self-conscious and self-reliant nationalism, and geography has made union and commercial and political development difficult. Hence the obnoxious Italian grip which dominated completely the country from 1925 to 1939, bringing about Italian intrigues and machinations in the Balkans. There are many hopes that, with a benevolent international tutelage, Albania can be put on its feet and lead a healthy political life.

In addition to this indispensable requirement of international protection of the independence of Albania, Greece is entitled to such a rectification of the southern frontiers of Albania as would restore to Greece the region of



MAP OF NORTHERN EPIRUS

Northern Epirus, to which Greece was always entitled on ethnological grounds and the cession of which would promote the economic welfare of the population and Greece's security requirements.

The question of Northern Epirus has been one of the most insistently disputed, involving as it did rival claims as well as the interests of Great Powers.

Included until 1940 in the State of Albania, Northern Epirus is the region north of the present boundary of Greece where the Greeks threw back the invading Fascist army. Its precise extent and population have never been clearly defined, but the area includes broadly the provinces of Korytsa, Argyrocastro and part of the province of Janina, viz., the counties of Korytsa, Starovo, Koloria, Argyrocastro, Khimara, Delvino, Liascovi, Tepeleni, Premeti, Pogonion and Philiates — a territory slightly larger than the State of Delaware, inhabited by a population of about 225,000.

Northern Epirus is of great strategic importance. It faces the extreme heel of Italy just below the narrowest point in the neck of the Adriatic. Its position makes it the natural way of entry and exit to the western Balkans. On the other hand, its coast is for the most part steep and its only harbor is at Santi-Quaranta (in Greek: Aghioi Saranta, "Forty Saints"). There is a trunk road from Santi-Quaranta to Argyrocastro and to Korytsa. For the rest, there are only a few paths from the coast to the interior. It is traversed by rivers, the most important of which is the Viosa or Voyussa River, and valleys that provide natural routes. Another trunk road was constructed in recent years from Valona, north of Northern Epirus, through Premeti to Korytsa.

This is an agricultural and stock raising country. Grain, maize and olive oil are its most important products, with tobacco grown in certain sections. Its extensive forests are still nearly in virgin state and while mineral deposits are believed to exist, no exploitation has ever been undertaken.

We are wont to identify Hellenism with the parts of the ancient world which bear the mark of Hellenic culture or the names of which are linked with historical events reported by ancient writers. This accounts for our ignorance of Epirus and of many other parts of continental Greece. Epirus, meaning mainland, in contradistinction to the well-known neighboring island of Kerkira (Corfu), was inhabited in the Hellenic era by the Molossians, whose rulers claimed direct descent from Pyrrhus, son of Achilles. These people had no racial similarity to the Illyrians, who inhabited the northern and central sections of pre-war Albania. Thucydides quotes the testimony of Herodotus on the hellenicity of the region and Polybius confirms, saying that Greece begins to the South of the Acrokeraünian Mountains, that divide Northern Epirus from Albania at Khimara on the coast, Kleissura in the center and Lake Prespa in the east. We find Themistocles, when banished by the Athenians, receiving the hospitality of Admetus in Epirus. Later Philip of Macedonia married an Epirote princess. And it was a King of Epirus, Pyrrhus, who gave the last battles of the Greek world

against the Romans. Both Southern and Northern Epirus were then part of Pyrrhus' Kingdom and were generally recognized as Greek.

The cultural connection of Epirus with Greece is eminently testified to by the most ancient and venerable of all Hellenic sanctuaries, the Pelasgian Dodona, famous throughout the Greek world, dedicated to Zeus, where the responses to the oracle were gathered by listening to the rustling of an old oak tree, the seat of the deity. The sanctuary and its reverence by the Greeks dated from the time of Homer, who refers to it both in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey*.

During the Byzantine times Epirus, northern and southern, formed part of the Eastern Greek Empire and at the capture of Constantinople by the crusaders in 1204, Epirus formed an independent Greek principality under Byzantine princes. And although the force of invasions during the Middle Ages tended to compress Illyria and Epirus together, the ancient distinction between the two groups of people has always been preserved.

The Hellenic character of Northern Epirus under the Turkish rule is best proved by the abominable crimes against its Greek population perpetrated by the Albanian tyrant of Janina, Ali Pasha, described by the French historian and diplomatic representative of Napoleon at his Court, Tocqueville. The slaughtering of the Greeks, the rape of women and the burning of homes described by him took place in Lucovo, Oudessoovo, Hagios-Vassileios, Nivitsa, Bouba, Delvino, Dredgsi — all in the region between Argyrocastro and Santi-Quaranta in Northern Epirus.

When the people of southern Greece rose against the Ottoman Empire in the War of Liberation in 1821, the inhabitants of Northern Epirus joined the fight and took a prominent part in the struggle for independence. Indeed, they had a large part in bringing on the War of Liberation, as great numbers of them formed part of the "Philiki Etairia," the secret society which prepared for the struggle. Two of the three founders of this society were Epirotes, Skoufas and Tsakaloff, the third being Xanthos, a Dodecanesian.

Toward the end of the Greek revolution of 1821, deputies from the whole of Epirus were sent and took part in the Fourth Greek National Assembly held in July 1829 at Argos. And while the Great Powers in their effort to maintain as far as possible the integrity of the Ottoman Empire did not include in the new Kingdom of Greece the whole of Epirus or even Thessaly, delegates from Epirus again took part in the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention of 1843 which adopted the first Parliamentary regime in Greece.

During the past century of the life of modern Greece, Epirus has been the heart of Hellenism. A striking evidence of this is the patriotism of Epirotes, who devoted vast fortunes to educational and social institutions of modern Greece. Practically all the higher educational centers of Greece, the University of Athens, the Polytechnic Institute, the Academy of Athens, the Museum of Fine Arts, the marble Stadium of Athens and most of the colleges, are due to the lavish patriotism of Epirotes. A few names will suf-

fice: Arsakis, who built four great women's colleges in Athens, Constantinople, Larissa and Janina, was a North Epirote from Chotachovo, near Argyrocastro. Zappas, the founder of the Museum of Fine Arts in Athens and of many schools, was from Lambovo, near Argyrocastro. Zographos, the founder of the Greek Zographeion College in Constantinople and the Zographeion Hospital in the same city, was born in Kestorati, near Tepeleli. His son, George Zographos, became a prominent political leader in Greece, served as Foreign Minister and in 1913 became the President of the Autonomous State of Northern Epirus. Pangas of Korytsa gave his entire wealth for schools in Greece. Michael Anagnos, a famous and honored citizen of Boston, left all his fortune for schools in Northern Epirus.

These patriots were representative types of many emigrants from Northern as well as Southern Epirus, who expanded throughout the Hellenic lands and the Hellenism of the "diaspora." Another type of emigrant from Epirus is the mass of artisans of all kinds that roamed all over Greece. Artisanry is an ancient Epirote tradition. Leaving their homes for several months, they sought work as stone masons, carpenters, tailors, tin-smiths and silversmiths — returning from time to time to their homes with their earnings. Their adventures and hardships, and the solitude in which their mothers and wives were left behind, gave rise to Greek folk songs of sadness and beauty. They kept the Greek tradition alive notwithstanding the ruthless persecution of a cruel master. They managed even to have Greek schools, which before the Balkan War of 1912 numbered more than two hundred in Northern Epirus.

Arnold Toynbee was right, then, when, calling attention to the fact that Greek nationalism is not an artificial concept of theorists but a real force which impelled all fragments of Greek-speaking populations to make sustained efforts toward political union within the national state, he pointed to the problem of Northern Epirus (Khimara, Argyrocastro and Korytsa) as the most striking example of the attractive powers of Hellenism. He thought that Greek culture under the Turkish yoke had accumulated a store of latent energy, which converted itself into a vigorous national revival.

The recent history of Northern Epirus dates from the Balkan War of 1912. The Greek army occupied this region as well as the rest of Epirus early in 1913. Normally she should have retained this territory as well as the other lands ceded by Turkey to the Allied States and divided among them. The question of Albanian independence had not been raised at that time. Albanian patriots worked for autonomy rather than independence, but there were two European powers, Italy and Austria-Hungary, which were intensely interested in the Albanian problem and had conflicting interests. This conflict was summed up by the late Mr. Tittoni, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 14, 1904, in a speech to the Italian Parliament. "Albania in itself is not of great importance," he said. "Its real value consists in its ports and its coasts, the possession of which for either Austria-Hungary or Italy would signify incontestable supremacy in the Adriatic."

So when a third power, Greece, was seeking to annex Southern Epirus

with the port of Valona and the island of Sasseno, Rome and Vienna made common cause and received the support of Berlin. France and her ally, Russia, supported the Greek claims. But in the presence of threats that Austria-Hungary and Italy were planning to occupy the country for the purpose of dividing it between them, Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, worked for a compromise between the Italian and Greek claims to the southern frontier of Albania.

As has been somewhat cynically said, the discovery of the Albanian question was due to the existence of two harbors on the Albanian coast: Durrazzo and Valona. Albania's creation as an independent state then seduced the European diplomacy, and at the negotiations concerning the southern frontier at the Conference of London in 1913, Greece yielded to Italy on Valona but she insisted that the line be drawn along strategic, economic and ethnographic lines. She claimed the port of Santi-Quaranta, since to leave the coast opposite Corfu to another power would create a permanent danger to Greece — a prophetic statement. She claimed the important district of Argyrocastro, which is geographically tributary to Santi-Quaranta and, if separated from the port, would be condemned to stagnation. For the same reason she claimed the district of Korytsa, since communicating with the sea by Janina and Santi-Quaranta it forms with them an indivisible unit. Besides the strategic and economic arguments, Greece also justified the annexation on ethnographic grounds, asserting that two-thirds of the inhabitants were Greeks.

A stream of requests for union with Greece deluged the London Conference for several months from Epirotes of the various districts and towns of Northern Epirus. They asked for an international committee to examine the aspirations and sentiments of the population. The London Conference accorded these requests little attention, preoccupied as it was with avoiding the rupture of the Conference and the precipitation of a European war. Accordingly, in August 1913, it accepted the proposals of Italy and Austria-Hungary and fixed the southern frontier of Albania so as to include Northern Epirus in the new state, thus sacrificing the national rights of these populations to the selfish and imperialistic interests of the aforesaid Powers.

In reaching this solution the Great Powers made, as has been said, a basic mistake; they failed to consult the population concerned. The result was that while an international commission appointed by the Conference after very little investigation and much fundamental disagreement fixed the details of the frontier in the Protocol of Florence of December 17, 1913, the population revolted and an autonomous state of Northern Epirus sprang into being in February 1914, including Khimara, Argyrocastro, Santi-Quaranta, Delvino and Korytsa, with a Greek Epirote leader, Zographos, as its President; it refused to recognize the Protocol in question. Greece remained strictly neutral. Finally the inhabitants of that area succeeded in the adoption of the Protocol of Corfu of May 17, 1914, which embodied special administrative and educational measures, safeguarding their national and cultural rights. International recognition of this Protocol was made by a decla-

ration of the Great Powers, including Italy and Austria-Hungary, to the Greek Government on July 1, 1914.

Within a few months, the first World War broke out, and in October 1914 Greece was invited by the Allies, including Italy, to occupy Northern Epirus, a fact which is a further proof of Greek rights over that territory.

By the secret Treaty of London in 1915 Italy bargained her entry into the war at the side of the Allies and was promised the foothold in Albania which she had long coveted, and in 1917, taking advantage of internal difficulties in Greece, she occupied for a time both Northern and Southern Epirus, but later limited its occupation to Northern Epirus.

At the Peace Conference an agreement between Italy and Greece, known as the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement, was reached on July 29, 1919, by the terms of which Italy agreed to support the Greek claims to Northern Epirus, in a kind of general settlement of the questions outstanding between the two countries.

In return for heavy Greek sacrifices, Italy recognized Greek rights not only in Northern Epirus but also in the Dodecanese Islands. The calm, however, did not remain unbroken for long. Italy decided soon thereafter not to honor her signature of the 29th of July 1919. On July 22, 1920, Count Sforza delivered an official note to the Greek Minister at Rome stating that "the decisions of the allies on the subject of Asia Minor and the nationalistic affirmations of the Albanian people have obliged the Italian government to modify the ends which they proposed to attain and to establish a new policy relative to the safeguarding of Italian interests in these regions." Count Sforza, who delivered this note to the Greek Minister, explained later in his book, "Makers of Modern Europe" published in 1930, the real reason for the denunciation of the agreement of 1919. "When I came to power in July 1920," he writes, "and took cognizance of this agreement which Tittoni had kept secret, I absolutely failed to see how it could be of any use to Italy. . . . Albania, to my mind, was to come under the sphere of Italian influence, but not as a result of a juridical solution wounding Albanian pride and working against the very force of Italian expansion in Albania. This being so — and bent on setting Italian policy toward ways which seemed to me more in conformity with our interests — I denounced the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement that meant for us just nothing but a series of burdens with no compensatory counterpart." The denunciation was never agreed to by Greece. Indeed, when the Treaty of Sèvres was to be signed, Mr. Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, insisted on Italy's performance and it was necessary for him to leave this conference in order to bring Italy into line and compel her to sign a new agreement on the 10th of August 1920 for the cession of the Dodecanese Islands. At the same time, Italy was compelled to accept the decision of the British, American and French delegations which recognized the justice of the Greek views concerning Northern Epirus. Greece, in the meantime, obtained a decided recognition of her rights over Northern Epirus when the Senate of the United States on May 17, 1920, adopted unanimously the following resolution (Senate Resolution 324):

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that Northern Epirus (including Corytsa), the Twelve Islands of the Aegean, and the Western Coast of Asia Minor, where a strong Greek population predominates, should be awarded by the Peace Conference to Greece and become incorporated in the Kingdom of Greece.

The American, British and French delegations at the Paris Conference were convinced that the western portion of Northern Epirus, comprising the districts of Santi-Quaranta and Argyrocastro and the easternmost portion including the district of Korytsa, were inhabited by a people with a Greek national consciousness. The central portion, sparsely populated and economically unimportant, was Albanian.

But Greece was then and until 1922 engaged in the fateful Greco-Turkish war in Asia Minor. Italy and France made common cause against England and Greece, and America had left the European Councils. The Asia Minor catastrophe and the many problems arising from the settlement of one million and a half refugees in Greece had caused the loss of any bargaining position for Greece. Albania was admitted to the League of Nations and signed a declaration to protect national minorities on October 2, 1921. Yugoslavia itself, tending to a rapprochement with Italy, abandoned her claims on a portion of northern Albania and advocated the reestablishment of the frontier of 1913. Thus everything conspired to conclude the question of Northern Epirus against Greece, with the result that a new Florence Protocol on January 27, 1925, ceded again all of Northern Epirus to Albania.

During the process of drawing up the southern frontier of Albania, Fascist Italy staged what has rightly been termed "one of the most infamous examples of international violence." In August 1923, the Italian General Tellini was murdered at a point close to the Greek-Albanian frontier under circumstances that have never been satisfactorily explained. Italy made exorbitant demands on Greece, its navy bombarded Corfu, a demilitarized city, killing a considerable number of people, and occupied the island; Mussolini refused the intervention of the League of Nations, but was finally compelled by the firm stand of the small nations in the League and the attitude of Great Britain to evacuate Corfu, but not before the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris virtually conceded everything Italy had demanded, including payment of an indemnity by Greece of about \$2,500,000.

Meantime the Albanian declaration of October 2, 1921, regarding minorities, which contained a pledge for the preservation of the Greek character of Northern Epirus, did not accomplish its object. Already the League Commission investigating conditions in southern Albania in 1923 noted that many of the inhabitants failed to realize that the status of southern Albania had been definitely determined by the Conference of Ambassadors; that "There was a strong and growing discontent among the Christian population in Southern Albania"; that while these people paid the greatest part of the Albanian state budget, only a small proportion of the total was expended for their needs. Thereafter Fascist Italy, with its powerful influence on the Albanian government, eager to accept Italian bounties, sub-

jected this Greek population to a harsh persecution which compelled the Greek inhabitants to emigrate or drove them to abandon everything Greek. Greek schools were gradually closed down with the result that they showed a continuous decline. The pre-war number of over 200 schools in Northern Epirus was reduced to 78 in 1925, 60 in 1928, 43 in 1931, 10 in 1933 and none in 1934. Greece had recourse to the Council of the League of Nations, which submitted the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court by its Advisory Opinion of April 6, 1935, upheld the Greek claim and held that Albania violated the stipulations of the declaration for the protection of minorities. Some Greek schools reopened a little later, but teachers and pupils could hardly work in the existing atmosphere of terrorism.

Then came Italy's invasion of Albania in 1939, which was a clear premonition of what happened later. Italy attacked Greece on the 28th of October 1940, and was repelled by the Greek forces on this very territory of Northern Epirus once more consecrated by Greek blood shed in defense against aggression.

The conclusions of this historical review are evident: the fate of Northern Epirus was never decided after consultation of the population concerned, and the legitimate claims of Greece were sacrificed in order to satisfy Austria-Hungary's and Italy's interests in 1913 and Italy's imperialist ambitions in 1920-1924. Greece occupied Northern Epirus by virtue of conquest as a result of the Balkan war of 1912 against Turkey. It occupied it from 1914 to 1917 during the World War at the invitation of the Great Powers. Its claims were recognized by Italy under the Venizelos-Tittoni accord of 1919, by the United States Senate and by the American, British and French delegations at the Peace Conference.

At the issue of this war the frontiers between Greek Epirus and Albania should be determined on the basis of the above described ethnological and cultural picture of Northern Epirus and also of the strategic aspect, which would guarantee security to Greece, and the economic welfare of the population.

The security requirements for Greece are self-evident, as a glance at the map will show. The pre-war boundary line is a winding line giving to Albania, just parallel to the frontier, the great trunk road from Santi-Quaranta to Korytsa, thus permitting easy movement of troops. Tepeleni, the ancient gateway into Epirus, dominates the approaches to the Janina plain down the Voyussa River on the east and the Drinos River on the west. As the campaign of 1940 proved, the Greek army based at Janina was at an enormous strategical disadvantage at the opening of the campaign and its effective action could be hopelessly paralyzed from the start, in view of the fact that the central approaches from the northwest were in the hands of the Fascists and the flanks were secured to them. In 1940 the enemy marched down the coast all the way to Parga with the greatest ease and through his invasion on the east toward Metsovo nearly blocked the Greek

army in Janina. The fact that the Greek army was able to turn back the invaders does not disprove this analysis.

Another observation is that, as the frontier stood before the war, the major part of the Greek island of Kerkyra (Corfu) lies opposite the southwesternmost extension of the Albanian frontier from Cape Stylos to Santi-Quaranta. Corfu was thus exposed completely to the enemy and the horrible ordeal received by the island from the Italian air force during 1940-1941 is testimony to this fact.

Thus it may truly be said that the frontier imposed upon Greece toward Albania at the end of the last war was one that could only be imposed upon a country forced to her knees after fighting an unsuccessful war; and this was not the case of Greece. Of course, this frontier was imposed at the demand of Italy, which had the motives which the whole world now knows.

A rational frontier would start from the Bay of Gramala below Valona, to the base of the inaccessible Acrokeraünian Mountains, following these mountains east to the chain of Mt. Kjore (6620 feet), northeast to the summit of Cepin (6055 feet), east to the narrows of Tepeleni and Kleisura, along the heights of the Dangli Mountains, northeast along the mountains of Ostrovitse and Kamne to join the Yugoslavian frontier at Lake Okhrida.

Nature appears to have closed the communications between the valley of Argyrocastro which would be left to Greece from the Bay of Valona in Albania. The communication between the two valleys is possible only across difficult routes. In contrast, below this frontier, the mountains shrink, the valley of Argyrocastro widens and the access to the sea, at Santi-Quaranta, is most easy by a motor road of about 30 miles through Delvino. Thus, Janina and Argyrocastro both belong naturally to whoever possesses Santi-Quaranta. The territory can be commanded in its entirety through the routes from Janina north to Argyrocastro and west to Santi-Quaranta.

The same is true of the valley of Korytsa to the east. This is also linked to Janina and Santi-Quaranta and forms with the valleys of Janina and Argyrocastro a geographic unity. It is securely protected by the Dangli Range and prevents the interception of direct communications between Epirus and Western Macedonia. No other communication exists between the eastern and western part of the frontier beyond the long, difficult and round-about route of Janina through Metsovo, Grevena and Kastoria.


On the coast the possession of Janina and Corfu by Greece presupposes the possession of Santi-Quaranta and of the coast to the Bay of Gramala. It is through the port of Santi-Quaranta that Janina can most easily receive reinforcements and food. The security of Corfu makes it imperative for Greece to possess the coast to the Bay of Gramala for by its proximity and arch-like configuration it commands Corfu. This solution would give to Greece between Corfu and the Epirote littoral a naval and submarine base with both its exit and entrance in Greek hands of the highest defensive value. And should an international force be established at the issue of this war, Greece would undoubtedly place this base and facilities for an air-base at the disposal of such international force, so as to give security to both Greece and Albania.

The aspect of the economic welfare of the population also militates in favor of this solution. The pre-war boundary line left Janina, the capital and principal city of Epirus, and its valley cut off from communication with the Adriatic Sea at Santi-Quaranta. Its only connection was with the port of Previsa, which afforded inferior facilities because ships of substantial tonnage cannot enter this port, while Santi-Quaranta, accessible to the largest ships, can assure communications with Corfu, Italy, the Adriatic ports and Western Europe. Also the region of Khimara, separated from the interior by inaccessible mountains and from Valona by considerable distance by sea, is exclusively dependent on this port and Corfu as outlets to its products. The district of Argyrocastro is naturally dependent on Janina and Santi-Quaranta and, separated from them, would be condemned to stagnation.

The great trunk road from Santi-Quaranta to Korytsa establishes such a geographic link that the whole region of Northern Epirus is in absolute economic solidarity with Janina. On the other hand, the linking of the natural frontiers of Epirus and Western Macedonia as indicated above would restore the economic connections between the two regions which had always existed before they were separated by the thrust of the frontier of Albania southward to include the valley of Korytsa. Indeed, Korytsa and the Western Macedonian towns of Florina and Kastoria form an economic unit, mutually dependent as supply centers and outlets and connected by rail through Florina with the large center of Salonika.*

EDWARD CAPPS

* Acknowledgment is made to Dr. Stephen Chaconas for statistical and other information included in the section, "Relations with Bulgaria," and to Dr. Stephen P. Ladas for similar information and data on the section, "Relations with Albania."



MAP OF THE DODECANESE ISLANDS

THE LIBERATION OF THE DODECANESE ISLANDS

We Dodecanesians are Greeks and have been Greeks since the first appearance of the Greek race in the world. We were Greeks in the time of Homer, we were Greeks when the Medes and Persians carried the war into Europe; we were Greeks in the days of Pericles. We Dodecanesians were Greek under the rule of Romans, under the Byzantine Emperors, under the Turks. As Greeks we arose and as Greeks we won our freedom at the rebirth of Greece. We were Greeks during the Balkan wars and Greeks during the European war, when we persistently and repeatedly demanded to fight by the side of the Allies.

We declare before God and man that we would rather perish to the last man than breathe or allow our children and brothers to breathe in the Dodecanese an air in which a flag flutters which is not the flag of Greece.

Memorandum presented by Dr. Skevos Zervos on behalf of the Dodecanese to the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919.

IN THE EASTERN Mediterranean fringing the coast of Asia Minor, lie the twelve Aegean islands of ancient Greece called the Dodecanesus. Small, mountainous, and in large part barren, their population today, mostly sailors, fishermen, sponge fishers, and fruit farmers, numbers not more than 140,000, yet their geographical position and their harbors make them of the utmost strategic importance as regards Constantinople, Anatolia, Syria, Egypt and Suez. This importance has been for the islanders a tragic misfortune, for from the dawn of history it has brought them wars, pillage, and invasions, and, except for nine years, since the fall of the Byzantine Empire they have suffered under alien rule. In spite of these invasions — and that of the Turks lasted over four hundred years — the islanders are of the purest blood of ancient Greece and have remained Greek not only in language and religion but devoted Greek patriots. In 1912, the Turkish rule was ended, but the islands — still cherishing their dearest wish of reunion with Greece — passed then under Italian occupation. Thus for over thirty years, covering the first World War as well as this one, the Dodecanese have been in the hands of Italy which has long since strongly fortified them as a spring-board for her dreams of empire. Yet, notwithstanding their unwilling bondage, the islanders, during this war as during the first World War, have been able to give invaluable aid to their mother country. When the Axis invaded Greece, many of the young men of the islands escaped from the grasp of their Italian rulers to Asia Minor, Cyprus, and Egypt and enlisted in the

Greek army and, when Greece fell, escaped again to the Allied army in Africa where they have shown such heroic spirit. On the sea, as well, the contribution of the islanders to the Allied cause is invaluable, for of the hundreds of Greek freighters scattered over every sea bringing supplies to the United Nations one third are owned and managed by Dodecanesians.

Throughout the ancient world the Southern Sporades, as the islands were then called, were famous as one of the vital centres of Mediterranean culture, and their people, numbering in those early days more than half a million, took an active part in the commerce, and in the political and intellectual life which centred on that sea. Four of the twelve islands are still well known to those with interest in history. The chief is Rhodes, the "Isle of Roses" and "the Bride of the Sun," which has an area of some five hundred fifty square miles, much of it rich, fertile soil, and lies only ten miles off the coast of Anatolia. No trace exists of the splendor of the ancient city but it is still famous for its Colossus, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world, erected to Helios Apollo, the Sun God, and also for its school of oratory where the leaders of Greek democracy were trained and where, after Roman occupation, Cicero, Caesar, Brutus, Cassius, and other great Romans of the Republic went to study rhetoric. Famous, too, it was for its code of maritime law which was widely adopted by the ancient world and survived through the Middle Ages in the Consulate del Mare, and famous it still is for its services to the fine arts, for the statues of the Laocoon now in the Vatican came probably from there, and the Farnese Bull in Naples, and possibly the Chariot of the Sun God in Venice, and its antique pottery is greatly valued.

Important, also, to the ancient and the modern world is another island, again close to the coast of Anatolia — Cos, the home of Apelles, the greatest painter of ancient Greece, and, for a time, of Theocritus, the father of pastoral poetry. Here in Cos, now famous for its olives and lettuces, was the great Temple of Asclepius, the god of Healing. Here Hippocrates, the father of Medicine, began the first scientific investigation of disease and of the organs of the body and, under a plane tree still in existence, held his medical clinic and taught his disciples, thus founding the first medical school of the Western World. The third island is a shrine to which all races and sects of Christianity have sent their pilgrims — the holy isle of Patmos, to which Saint John the Evangelist retired from the world, either from choice or banishment, and wrote the Book of Revelation in a grotto now named for the Apocalypse. The fourth island is Cassos, a great name to all Greeks for during the Greek War of Independence in the early nineteenth century the important contribution of the Dodecanesians to the freeing of the mother country from the Turks was due almost entirely to the powerful fleet of Cassos, and again, today, it is from Cassos that comes a large part of the Greek merchant ships helping the Allied cause. The remaining islands now mean to the outer world only legends of ancient gods, and nymphs, and heroes. These are Leros, where the daughters of Aeneas, changed to guinea-fowl by a sympathetic Artemis because of their inconsolable wailing at the tomb of their brother, Meleager, were brought by

the goddess to continue their mournful dirge around her temple; Carpathos, the island of the Titans who waged war on Zeus; Nisyros and Chalki with Tilos between them, created by Poseidon's trident from a fragment of Cos; Symi and Calymnos, the homes of those indomitable men who make their annual visit to fish for sponges in the waters of North Africa; and Astypalaea and Castellorizo.

Yet all these have had their day of glory. Independent city states, their ships were counted with the fleets of Greece in all her ventures. To aid Agamemnon in the siege of Troy the "haughty Rhodians," so Homer tells us, brought from "that most pleasant land" nine "tall ships." Three "well-trimmed ships" were manned by the men of Symi, and from the other islands thirty galleys "cleaved the liquid plain." In historic times also the islands, which sent picked teams to the Olympic, the Isthmian, and the Pythian games, took full share in Greek wars as well. Themistocles with the Athenian fleet delivered the Dodecanese from the Persians, and the islanders fought in the Peloponnesian Wars. After the death of Alexander the Great, the Rhodians expelled the Macedonian garrison and not only maintained their independence but acquired great political influence. Indeed, so high was the prestige of the Aegean Greeks and so powerful their fleet that, after the decline of Macedonian power, control of the Aegean passed for a time to the Rhodian Republic, which used it to maintain the existing balance of power and the safety of the seas. Rome, become the arbiter of the Eastern Mediterranean, in 164 B.C., arranged an alliance with the people of Rhodes, and the twenty-two ships of the island state sailed with the eighty vessels of Rome in her wars. The alliance ended in 43 B.C. with the sack of Rhodes by Cassius, and the destruction of the Rhodian fleet. Her commercial prosperity crippled and her capital ruined by a series of earthquakes, in 155 A.D. Rhodes finally lost her independence and, with the other islands, suffered complete incorporation as a province of the Empire, as Greece herself had become.

Under Roman rule the Dodecanese, though bled white by taxation, maintained their prestige as centres of learning. Not only did young Romans continue to flock to the school of oratory on Rhodes, but also to Cos to study medicine. It is said that through the skill of her physicians, that island occasionally won from Roman Emperors and Generals some mitigation of the most crushing taxes. Still more important, the islands were able to retain their traditional public assemblies, which dealt with the budget and all other matters of gravity, and which elected the municipal bodies called *demogerontiae* — from *demos* — people, and *gerontes* — elders, — which were composed of the mayor and the city fathers.

With the coming of Christianity the Dodecanese became one of the first cradles of the new faith. The earliest places of Christian worship on the islands date from the Apostolic Age when various of the Disciples, — Saint Paul among them — visited the islands in the spreading of the Gospel. Many of the ancient Greek temples to the gods were transformed into

Christian churches and various of the gods themselves became identified with Christian saints. On Nisyros, the altar of Poseidon, the ruler of the sea and patron of sailors, was rededicated to Saint Nicholas, believed to protect seafarers, and the icons of the Saint decorate the masts or sterns of island boats. Helios, the Sun God, became Saint Elias, still with power over sunlight, thunder, and rain. On Patmos, on the site of the temple of Artemis, was built the rich monastery of Saint John the Evangelist which holds his mummified body in a silver coffin, and priceless treasures of sacerdotal plate and vestments, and a famous library filled with ancient and historic manuscripts.

Under the weak central government of the Byzantine Empire, of which the Dodecanese ranked as a province, the islands were devastated by pirates and marauding fleets and the population was greatly reduced in numbers. The Venetians wrested the islands from the declining Byzantine power in 1207, bringing ruin and death to those who resisted them, and the threat of capture by Rome of their beloved Church. In 1310 Venetian rule was replaced by that of the international order of the Knights Hospitallers of Saint John of Jerusalem who, driven from the Holy Land by the forces of Islam, established themselves on Rhodes as a base either for return to Palestine, or for protection of the southern seas against the Moslems. They fortified Rhodes and built there their hospital, and the palace of the Grand Master, and the hostels for the nine "tongues" which defended each a part of their great battlements — all of which may still be seen — and there they flourished until Suleiman the Magnificent finally overpowered them.

Under the Knights the local assemblies and *demogerontiae* were left untouched as were the Greek language and customs. The effort to force control by the Roman Church over the Greek Orthodox islanders was intensified, however, and they were still pitifully taxed. Nevertheless, from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 they fought bravely on the side of the Knights to repel the Ottoman power. Finally, in 1522, the Turkish fleet besieged and bombarded Rhodes and after heroic resistance the Knights surrendered and departed. By 1537 all of the other islands had fallen under Turkish rule.

The conqueror Suleiman turned Christian churches into mosques, building on each a minaret, but, following Turkish constitutional practice in their conquests, left the administration of the Orthodox Church unmolested. He gave to the people not only freedom of religion but exemption from military service, and made no attempt to interfere with their language. Over Rhodes and Cos he placed a Turkish governor but left the public assemblies and *demogerontiae*. As for the other islands, so rocky and barren as to be incapable of providing any considerable revenue, he made a treaty with their elected delegates guaranteeing complete autonomy of local administration in consideration of a yearly tax or "Maktou," to cover the cost of Turkish "protection." Thus they were free to continue to conduct their own local affairs through their elected representatives and with these and the Orthodox religious courts the only legal limit to the freedom of the "Privileged Isles" was the payment of the "Maktou."

The Greek Church was no longer in danger. The monastery on Patmos continued to depend in ecclesiastical matters directly on the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople and acquired through the centuries great influence in the Christian East. This apparently did not annoy the Turks, for at one time the learned friars gained such fame that they were given special protection by the Porte. Nevertheless the islands for nearly four centuries were lost in the "stagnant backwater of Islam" to quote the admirable phrase used in "Italy's Aegean Possessions" by C. D. and I. B. Booth, the best study of the Dodecanese published in our time.

The islanders remained far from reconciled to the presence of Islam. The monastery on Patmos became the centre in times of stress for the national expression of imperishable allegiance to Hellenic institutions. Marriage with a Moslem was looked on as unpardonable disgrace and the blood of the islanders remained remarkably free from admixture. The Turks were evidently under no illusions as to the possibility of weaning the Greeks of the Dodecanese from their longing to return the islands to Greece. No Greeks, they say, were allowed to pass the night inside the walls of Rhodes.

At the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence from Turkey the islanders joined with their brother Hellenes in the national struggle for freedom and aided materially in freeing the whole archipelago, in spite of massacres by the Turks on Rhodes and Cos. Thus, after centuries, the Aegean Islands had achieved reunion with their mother country.

The union was short. In 1830 the "Protecting Powers," in the Protocol of London which determined the frontiers of liberated Greece, forced her to hand the Dodecanese, together with Samos, back to Turkey in exchange for the island of Euboea.

Again the islands were caught in the backwater of Islam. Their former privileges were gradually restored and by the Treaties of Paris of 1856 and of Berlin of 1878 were placed under the guarantee of the Powers. The guarantee amounted to little, however, for though British Foreign Ministers, in answer to petitions from the islands, attempted to protect their privileges, the years passed in a continuous struggle to retain them against the encroachments and abuses of pashas and governors and, after 1908, against the efforts of the Young Turks to wipe out everything pertaining to the old regime.

No doubt the system of private schools, established and fondly supported by the Greek islanders, aided them in the struggle. The public schools of the islands, run with public funds, were Mussulman, but the Orthodox communities were allowed to set up private schools under direction of the elected bodies of the Orthodox Church. There was thus a private Greek school in each village and a high school in each of the larger towns, all supported by voluntary contributions from the islanders, many of them highly cultivated, a considerable number of them people of substance, and all possessing a traditional respect for education. Moreover the Dodecanesians who left the islands and who made fortunes in Egypt or America have

been generous in founding or aiding many an educational institution in their native islands.

In spite of centuries of domination only a comparatively small number of Turks, — 6,874 according to a computation made in 1912, — lived in the Islands, mostly on Rhodes, where there were also 2,445 Jews, largely Spanish, while the Hellenes numbered 133,761.

This was the situation when Italy went to war with Turkey over Tripoli in 1912. At once she occupied the islands. As the Italians promised liberation from Turkish rule, the islanders welcomed the Italians as deliverers and with their aid the Italian forces expelled the weak Turkish garrison. The Italian general in a formal statement to the demogerontia of Rhodes declared that the islands, "provisionally occupied by Italy," would have an autonomous government and that "whatever might be the fate of the islanders, Italy in any case would not permit by any pretext that such a large mass of civilized Greek people should again come under the barbarous Turkish yoke."

Fearful, nevertheless, that they would be handed back to Turkey when the war ended, or that Italy would keep them, the popular assemblies of all the islands thereupon elected delegates who met on Patmos on June 17, 1912, and unanimously adopted a resolution expressing the infinite gratitude of the islands to "the brotherly Italian nation, her King and her government" for having delivered them from "the intolerable yoke of the Turks"; stating "the firm determination of the people of these Christian islands to undergo any sacrifice rather than return under the frightful tyranny of the Turks"; declaring "the permanent national wish of the Aegeans to be united with their mother country, Greece"; and proclaiming the complete autonomy of the liberated islands under the name of the "Aegean State." Copies of this resolution were handed to the Great Powers as well as to the Italian Government. The Dodecanesians resident in Greece and Egypt, through duly appointed delegates, gave their support to the resolutions.

As the Greeks had feared, the thanks to Italy were premature. The only result of the resolution was an immediate curtailment of liberty in the islands and a campaign in the Italian Press for permanent occupation. Italians had forgotten that only a short half century before, the case for Italian freedom had been based on the right of self-determination, and that the union of all the parts of Italy had been effected by Cavour by means of plebiscites to prove the popular will. Under the Treaty of Peace between Italy and Turkey signed at Lausanne (Ouchy) on October 15, 1914, Italy agreed to hand the islands back to Turkey immediately following evacuation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica by the Turkish forces.

The islanders in protest again resorted to their democratic assemblies. In spite of the dangers attending all public meetings during Italian occupation, they held one in every island at which the voters again expressed their unwillingness to be handed back to Turkey and their firm intention to be united to Greece. These resolutions were addressed to the three Prime

Ministers, Sir Edward Grey, Signor Giolitti, and M. Venizelos, and to the Conference of Ambassadors then meeting in London to end the First Balkan War.

Informal plebiscites as they were, there could be no doubt that these votes for union with Greece represented faithfully the will of the people. They were, however, without effect. To be sure, Italy did not hand the islands over to Turkey but, on the excuse that the latter had not evacuated Tripoli, she herself remained in occupation. That this occupation was intended to be permanent was indicated by the introduction of heavy taxation, espionage by secret police, censorship of the Press, and other measures. After the outbreak of the first World War, Italy exacted full sovereignty over the Dodecanese as part of her price for joining the Allies and was so promised in Article 8 of the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915.

No doubt encouraged by the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, with the signing of the Armistice in November 1918, the Dodecanesians determined to make an appeal to the Peace Conference. Those resident in the islands were unable to go themselves to Paris but they could turn to the Dodecanesians who had escaped from Italian rule and who by publicity and organizing work were the mainspring of the struggle for liberation of the islands. Accordingly, the islanders invested full powers in a strong delegation of Dodecanesians resident in Athens and Alexandria to act for them. This delegation presented to the Conference the resolutions of 1912 and others more recently adopted. One was by the people of Rhodes who on Easter Sunday, 1919, had passed a resolution for union with Greece. This day the islanders call "the bloody Easter" for they recall that on that day the courageous priest who prayed for the liberation of the islands and their union with Greece was bayoneted at the altar by the Italian soldiers; that many civilians were brutally attacked by Italian troops and several died of their wounds; and that many more were imprisoned and mercilessly whipped. M. Venizelos also presented a memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference for the Greek Government, supporting the claims of the Dodecanese.

American opinion both at home and in Paris was strongly on the side of the Dodecanese. The American experts, in their recommendations of January 21, 1919, to the American delegation at Paris, had advised that Rhodes and the Dodecanese be assigned to Greece, as over 80% of the inhabitants were Greek Orthodox and were "bitterly opposed to the present Italian occupation and should be assigned to the mother country." We know from the documents published later by David Hunter Miller that President Wilson strongly concurred, for he is quoted therein as saying, during the Fiume controversy, that "the only advantage in letting the Italians have Fiume would be that it would break the Treaty of London, which he was disturbed to find allotted the Dodecanese to Italy." The United States Senate is also on record, for on May 17, 1920, it adopted a resolution, introduced by Senator Lodge, stating that "Northern Epirus, the twelve islands of the

Aegean, and the Western Coast of Asia Minor, where a strong Greek population predominates, should be awarded by the Peace Conference to Greece and become incorporated in the Kingdom of Greece."

It seemed for a time that the Dodecanese would get their wish. In return for the promise of Greek support of Italian ambitions in Asia Minor, Signor Tittoni promised in the name of Italy, in an agreement with M. Venizelos signed on July 29, 1919, to cede to Greece all of the Aegean isles except Rhodes, and by an additional secret agreement Italy, in the event that Britain should announce her willingness to cede Cyprus to Greece, bound herself to allow the people of Rhodes "to give a free expression of their wishes as to the destiny of the island." However, a year later, Italy denounced this agreement, her official explanation indicating that this was because she had failed to secure from the Peace Conference her aspirations in Asia Minor and the Albanians had refused to allow the Italian army to get a foothold in their country. Against this withdrawal by Italy of all promise to liberate the Dodecanese, Premier Venizelos protested strongly, as Greece had not failed in her obligation under the agreement. On August 10, 1920, Turkey by the Treaty of Sèvres renounced in favor of Italy all rights and title over the Dodecanese, and on the same day, under pressure of the United States, Britain and France, it is said, Italy, in a treaty with Greece signed at Paris, made over her rights in the islands to Greece, again with the exclusion of Rhodes whose fate was to be decided by plebiscite in the event that Britain should decide to cede Cyprus to Greece, and in any case not earlier than fifteen years after the signing of the treaty. The conditions under which the people should take part in the plebiscite were to be fixed by the League of Nations.

It appears that for the moment Italy intended to fulfill her promise, if one can take as an indication the passports issued by the Italian authorities to Dodecanesians, for these stated clearly that they would not be valid beyond the date when the islands — the passport shown as a specimen refers to Calymnos — should be returned to Greece. After the Greek debacle in Anatolia, however, Italy announced that the treaty had lapsed, owing to non-ratification.

The Greek delegation at Lausanne, commenting on the draft of the treaty, on January 29, 1923, deposited a reservation calling attention to the non-ratified Convention of Sèvres between Italy and Greece on the Dodecanese, "reserving the right to engage in the necessary negotiations for the determination of the fate 'of the Dodecanese' and counting on the spirit of justice and equity of all and particularly of the Italian Government to give to the question of the Dodecanese Islands a solution conforming to the principle of nationalities and of the agreements which had already intervened." No comment or answer to this reservation was made by Italy. In the Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923, Turkey renounced in favor of Italy all rights and title over the Dodecanese "the future of the islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned."

Italy has never settled either with Greece or with the islands. Turkey's sovereignty over the islands was limited by the privileges of self-govern-

ment agreed upon by the Porte and the islanders. Italy has recognized no such limitations, although legally she could not get more rights from Turkey over the islands than Turkey herself possessed.

With the growth of power of Mussolini, Italian rule has weighed ever more heavily on the islands. In the city of Rhodes, Italian Commissioners govern without mandate from the people or responsibility to them. Other towns have retained their demogerontiae but the elections have become farcical as the candidates are selected by the local commanders of carabinieri who are petty despots. The sponge fishers have suffered discrimination, the farmers have been hard hit by laws regarding forests and grain. Freedom of speech and of the Press are non-existent, it being unlawful to publish any criticism of the regime or its measures. Greek newspapers are excluded. Espionage is rife, and has resulted in exile for doctors, lawyers, mayors, priests, and other citizens. Even the use of the Greek colors of blue and white is outlawed and everywhere are painted portraits of the Duce. In 1934, the measures of restriction were intensified, for Mussolini then began to construct a submarine base at Leros and, shortly after that, base hospitals for his African war, on Rhodes and other islands. The Greek language was put under legal ban, the Greek schools were closed and Greek leaders expatriated. What must the Islanders be suffering today, during the pressure of the Second World War!

It should be said in honor of Italy that the chief Italians now resident in the United States, and the Mazzini Society, are generous enough to side openly with the Dodecanesians in their national aspirations and to look forward to the day when not only Italy but the Greek islands shall be free.

Let us hope that when the United Nations, among whom Greece holds a place of special honor, shall have triumphed over the Axis, the wrongs of centuries will be righted and justice done to the desire of the people of the Dodecanese to reunite with their beloved Mother Country. But justice, to be effective, must be coupled with security. The strategic importance of the islands, which has not lessened but increased with the evolution of modern warfare, will be a constant danger to their own safety, and to that of the Mediterranean and of the world, unless the United Nations set up an international organization equipped with an international force to watch over world peace. The Dodecanese, and Cyprus also, would seem fitted by geography and history for use, under Greek sovereignty, as bases for part of the international air force which shall protect against aggression not only Greece but all the countries surrounding the Mediterranean.

SARAH WAMBAUGH

THE UNION OF CYPRUS WITH GREECE

There is a Greek word which figures very largely and is used with peculiar emphasis in the Greek newspapers published in Cyprus; it is seldom omitted from the political harangues which the Greek Cypriote loves to deliver on every possible occasion; it is to be heard in the Greek Orthodox churches in the sermons preached on the occasion of each national festival; clubs endeavour to obtain members and newspaper subscribers by adopting the word as their official designation; and it is to be found in practically every one of the many memorials which have been submitted from time to time by the leaders of the Greek community in Cyprus, either to the local or Imperial Government.

The word in question is "Enosis," meaning "Union," and it is used to designate the political aspiration for the union of Cyprus with the Kingdom of Greece.

This political aspiration dates back from before the time of the British occupation; but it received a considerable impetus from that event, since the Turkish domination was thereby partially removed from the island.

The annexation of the island by Great Britain on the outbreak of the war with Turkey in 1914 caused an important change in the situation, and left England free to do with Cyprus what she would. The following year Cyprus was offered to Greece on certain conditions. The offer was refused, and lapsed. But the incident showed that England was prepared to recognize that on national grounds the claims put forward by the Greek-speaking Cypriotes, that the island should be united with Greece, were not considered unjustifiable.

(From "Cyprus Under British Rule" by Captain C. W. T. Orr, ex-Chief Secretary to the Government of Cyprus, 1918.)

I subjoin the satisfaction I should feel, were it granted to me, before the close of my long life, to see the population of the Hellenic Island of Cyprus placed by a friendly arrangement in organic union with their brethren of the Kingdom and Crete . . .

(Extract from letter of Gladstone to the Duke of Westminster, dated March 13, 1897.)

I

AT THE EXTREME northeast corner of the Mediterranean lies the large island of Cyprus. With an area of 3,584 square miles, of a maximum length of about 140 miles and breadth of about 60 miles, it is more than twice as large as Long Island. The only Mediterranean Islands that exceed it in size

are Sicily and Sardinia. The population of Cyprus, according to the last census (1931), is 372,810 inhabitants. Of these, 306,640 are Greeks and 66,170 Turks, i.e. in the proportion of 80% Greeks and 20% Turks.

There has been a constant increase of the population since the occupation of the island by the British in 1878. In 1881 there were 186,173 inhabitants; in 1901, 237,622; and in 1921, 310,709. The increase is chiefly accounted for by the Greeks, who average six children to a family. The present population is still small for the island. In its best days, Cyprus maintained a million people.

II

Recent archaeological research shows that the history of Cyprus goes back at least to the Neolithic period. The earliest settlements cannot as yet be connected with any particular culture, and although they resemble in general the Stone Age culture common to the entire Eastern Mediterranean, they have many qualities which are peculiarly Cypriote.

This same Cypriote quality is retained throughout the entire history of Cyprus with a remarkable tenacity, and in fact the spirit of strong conservatism, which is everywhere and at all times characteristic of Cyprus, can easily be noted as early as the Bronze Age.

Research has also shown that tradition was correct in reporting large-scale migrations from Greece to Cyprus in prehistoric times. Imports during the Mycenaean period were common enough to be found today in considerable quantities, and the whole culture took on a definite Mycenaean — that is to say Hellenic — aspect, which it has preserved to this day.

The syllabic writing used throughout the Mycenaean world was retained in Cyprus down through the Golden Age of Greece, when it was used for the classical Greek language, and can now be deciphered. Scholars hope to find the key to the unknown Mycenaean language through this extraordinary example of Cypriote conservatism, and it already seems quite certain that the language was a primitive form of Greek. Certainly the Hellenic nature of Cypriote art and civilization was predominant during the "Heroic Age," when Cyprus was a brilliant center of Greek civilization at a time when the mainland and the more northern islands were plunged into darkness by the Dorian invasions. During classical times, and until Alexander the Great, Cyprus was considered the Easternmost outpost of Greek civilization. It was a very rich island when it fell to the Romans in the year 58 B.C. and had the good fortune of having Cicero as its proconsul for a number of years. Upon the partition of East and West in A.D. 395, Cyprus fell to the Byzantine Empire, a member of which it remained till 1184. The Lusignans of the Crusades ruled it for over 300 years until it was occupied by the Venetians in 1489. These were succeeded by the Ottomans in 1571, who remained in possession for a little over three centuries.

This was a ruinous period for the island. A heavy tribute and crushing taxation led quickly to complete economic decadence. It was plundered of its riches, its schools were closed and oppression even drove part of its

population to embrace the Moslem faith in order to escape extermination. With the help of the privileges granted to the Greek Orthodox Church, however, and by a new system of local administration, national sentiment was kept alive. During the Greek War of Liberation of 1821-1830, the Cypriote people were suspected of pro-Greek sympathies and of actively assisting Greece, and were harshly punished. Their cities and villages were sacked, their people were massacred and some were sold on the slave markets of the Orient. The destruction was completed during the period of 1832-1840 when the island was administered by the Khedive of Egypt.

When the island was returned to the Sublime Porte in 1840, Cyprus was granted a more gentle rule, with broad administrative autonomy. At the same time the island attracted the attention of other Powers. In 1849, a German diplomat expressed Germany's interest in obtaining a point of support in the Middle East and suggested the possibility of securing from the Sublime Porte the possession of Cyprus. Russia's attitude toward the Ottoman Empire grew even more aggressive. And England, after the building of the Suez Canal, was seeking to establish strategic bases in the southwest and east, and also sought a place not far from the Dardanelles whence she could keep a watchful eye on the Straits. No place seemed more suitable to Disraeli than the large island in the southeastern Mediterranean.

Russia's victory over the Ottoman Empire provided the opportunity. The Treaty of San Stefano gave to Russia Kars and Batum on the southeast coast of the Black Sea; and Disraeli was able to close a shrewd bargain with the Porte. He did not ask the Sultan to alienate territory from his sovereignty, nor to diminish the receipts passing to his Treasury from Cyprus. He offered a defensive alliance to the Porte, and as an assurance of good faith, the Sultan assigned Cyprus to the occupation and administration of England. The sensibilities of the Sultan were guarded by a clause wherein this occupation and administration should be temporary. If at any time Russia were to surrender to the Porte the territory it had acquired in Asia by the war of 1878, the island was to be immediately evacuated by the British.

The British landed in Cyprus on June 19, 1878. The Greek population of the island received them with enthusiasm, feeling certain that this occupation was a first step towards the obvious solution: the natural union with Greece. The Archbishop of Cyprus, at the head of a Cypriote Greek delegation, voiced this sentiment at the reception ceremonies for the British High Commissioner: "We are glad for the change of government, yet we are Greeks, and desire to see Cyprus a part of Greece."

This forthright and categorical declaration was the beginning of unceasing efforts for union with Greece which have continued throughout the past sixty-five years. Unfortunately, however, it was soon followed by a lack of confidence and a feeling of mutual distrust, which have persisted throughout this period.

III

We have already noted that the Greeks formed the dominant factor in the population of Cyprus from very early times. Both the wealth and the stra-

tegic position of the island have brought many conquerors, but the strong conservatism of the Cypriote people has kept their Hellenic character ever predominant. Today the language of the great majority is modern Greek, which has a strong and peculiarly Cypriote flavor coming partly from remnants of the ancient dialect, partly from borrowings, and even more from the language of Byzantine times which only here survives.

Cypriote popular tradition and poetry has for long been a rich field for the student of ancient and Byzantine folk-lore. With this historic sense and national consciousness in the very heart of the people, it is not surprising that they have always yearned to unite with the Greek Fatherland.

The sincerity and spontaneity of the Cypriote's desire for union with Greece is evident. No one has admitted this more eloquently than today's great leader of the British Empire, Mr. Winston Churchill. When he visited Cyprus as Under-Secretary for the Colonies, he was received by the Cypriote people as their champion. On reading a memorandum on their desire for union with Greece, he said, "I think it is only natural that the Cypriote people, who are of Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their mother country, as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly and fervently cherished. Such a feeling is an example of the patriotic devotion which so nobly characterizes the Greek nation."

The powerful surge of Hellenism in Cyprus is in no wise inspired by hostility to Great Britain, for the Cypriotes, as all Greeks, have always felt a deep friendship and admiration for the British. However, the strong feeling of self-respect and independence which is characteristic of all Greeks has not combined well with the British system of colonial administration, designed chiefly for colonies in Asia and Africa.

The curtness of Britain's refusals to all appeals for union with Greece has caused further irritation. At the same time, the Greeks of the mother country have at all times expressed their solidarity with the aims and desires of the Cypriotes, and, puzzled at the lack of response from Britain, have added their own voice to the Cypriote appeal.

To the demands voiced by the Cypriote Greeks in common meetings, and to memoranda submitted to the London Government, the British Government has responded in various ways. At first, it contended that Cyprus was then under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and that Britain was only the agent of that Sovereign. Secondly, while recognizing the sentiments of the Greek population, it saw no reason to believe that the Moslems of Cyprus would accept the union of the island with Greece. Third, British statesmen have pointed out that a country of such limited resources as Greece could not solve the economic difficulties of Cyprus and that the Cypriotes would be happier under a great power such as Great Britain.

This last declaration (Joseph Chamberlain to the Commons in 1902) was psychologically the worst excuse that could be given to a sentimental and warm-hearted people. It succeeded only in creating a bitter feeling of resentment. The Greek members of the Legislative Council pointed out that the choice between a poor Greece and a powerful Britain was one which belonged to the people, and proposed that the matter be put at once to

popular vote. Ever since that time, the Cypriote people, through their representatives on the Legislative Council, their church councils, and special delegations, have repeated their demand for union with Greece at each change of Ministry, each change in the Colonial Ministry, and to each newly-appointed High Commissioner.

The memorandum submitted to Mr. Churchill when he visited Cyprus in 1907 as Under-Secretary for the Colonies is typical. It referred to the aspirations of the people for union with Greece, expressed since the day of British occupation by the Archbishop of Cyprus and reiterated ever since. "We expect," it added, "with confidence, the accomplishment of this wish as early as possible by the British nation, which, continuing its liberal tradition manifested at another time on behalf of the Ionian Islands, and adding one more immortal page to its glorious history, will draw the eternal gratitude not only of the Cypriotes, but of all Hellenism. It is in the arms of the mother country that Cyprus will enjoy the benefits of liberty to which each people has its inalienable rights, especially a people who in origin, in language, in religion and in culture is an integral part of the immortal Greek nation which founded and developed civilization."

We previously quoted Mr. Churchill's recognition of the nobility and sincerity of this demand by the Cypriote people. However, he, too, was at that time disturbed by the existence of a Moslem minority, and voiced the desire of the British Government to avoid the dismemberment and the weakening of the Sultan's sovereignty.

The occupation of Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese by Italy in 1911 heralded a period of tension between the people of Cyprus and the British authorities which steadily increased up to the beginning of the first World War in 1914. The Greek members of the Legislative Council renewed their demand for union with Greece and also insisted on improvements in the regime of the island. They claimed proportionate representation on the Legislative Council. They demanded the abolition of tribute which now went to the British Treasury. They insisted that administrative offices should be open to the Cypriote people rather than concentrated in British hands; that the people should be eligible to at least minor judicial posts — in one word, that they be treated as free and self-respecting men. Their demands were rejected, and the Greek members of the Legislative Council resigned. Popular demonstrations followed in approval of this attitude, and a national committee was formed under the chairmanship of the Archbishop. In January of 1913, an assembly convened in Nicosia and proclaimed the union of the island with Greece.

At the same time the Balkan Peace Conference was in session in London. There was an unofficial exchange of views between the Greek Premier, Mr. Venizelos, and Mr. Lloyd George, who represented the British Prime Minister. Great Britain, already fearing a European War, proposed to Mr. Venizelos the cession of Cyprus to Greece on the condition that in case of war Britain might use the port of Argostoli on Cephalonia as a naval base. Mr. Venizelos replied that, for his part, the condition was eminently ac-

ceptable, since in any war Greece would be at the side of Great Britain. After consulting his Government, Mr. Venizelos confirmed his acceptance in a new interview, at which the First Lord of the Admiralty and Admiral Baltenberg were present, and offered to make the grant at once. Apparently all was ready for the conclusion of the pact when the first World War broke out.

This same offer, however, was made by England on October 16, 1915, now with the provision that Greece should come to the immediate assistance of Serbia, then under attack by Austro-Hungary and Bulgaria. The offer fell through because of the Greek King's refusal to intervene in the war at the time, and it was formally withdrawn by Great Britain. Subsequently, Greece entered the war in 1917 on the side of the Allies but the offer of Cyprus was not renewed.

At the Peace Conference in Paris, Greece and the Cypriotes fully expected the union of Cyprus and Greece. They felt that the offer of 1915 indicated a willingness on Great Britain's part to accede to the heart-felt wish of the Cypriote people. Furthermore, such action seemed unavoidable in view of the principles of self-determination and liberty of peoples, proclaimed by the Allied and Associated Powers. They were encouraged by the formal declaration by Mr. MacDonald before the Socialist Congress of Berne in 1919 — that "the British Labor Party would apply the principle of self-determination to Cyprus." Mr. Venizelos, in a memorandum dated October 30, 1918, requested the cession of Cyprus to Greece. And a Cypriote delegation received on February 3, 1919, by Lord Milner, Secretary of State for Colonies in London, reiterated its demand for union; for the first time it did not meet with outright refusal.

Venizelos, in fact, obtained from Mr. Lloyd George a promise that Cyprus would be restored to Greece if Italy gave up Rhodes. With this promise in hand, Venizelos negotiated the agreement of 1919 with the Italian Foreign Minister, Tittoni, providing for the return of the Dodecanese to Greece. The denunciation of the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement by Italy in 1920 and later the Greek defeat in Asia Minor destroyed these hopes. The problem of Cyprus again fell back upon the Cypriotes and the British Government.

The Greeks of Cyprus, seeing their hopes shattered, showed their disappointment by a policy of passive resistance. The Greek members of the Legislative Council resigned their offices and in three successive elections the Greeks refused to participate, so that for more than two years the Greek seats on the Council remained vacant. Then followed a division in the ranks of the Greeks with the formation from 1923–1927 of a "Greek Government Party" advocating cooperation with the Colonial Government for the purpose of securing local political freedom and obtaining improvement of economic conditions of the islands. The opposition party, called the "Political Organization," though enlisting in its ranks the best Greek elements in Cyprus, spent itself in politics and immature activities.

Resentful of the internal policy of the colonial administration and un-

willing to accept the proffer of larger political rights for fear that these might weaken the desire for union with Greece, the "Political Organization" became more aggressive. Political leaders in Greece vainly warned the Cypriotes that excessive attacks against the British could not help the solution of the question. The climax was reached in 1931 with the disturbances at Nicosia, which culminated in the burning of Government House.

The British were justly angry. The constitution was abolished. The Governor assumed full powers with a Council consisting only of British officials. Education as a whole became a government function. Turbulent Bishops were exiled and the display of Greek flags was forbidden.

IV

Under the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878, the island remained nominally a part of the Turkish Empire, although the administration came under the British Colonial Office. In effect, of course, Cyprus was a British possession ruled by a High Commissioner with a Legislative Council which satisfied the demand of the more liberal-minded British for self-government, though its composition was such that the Greek majority was powerless. Consisting of 18 members, the Council included 9 Greeks, 3 Moslems and 6 British officials, with the High Commissioner having the casting vote.

In 1914, after Turkey entered the war at the side of the Central Powers, Britain annexed Cyprus, thus bringing to an end the nominal sovereignty of Turkey, and in 1925 proclaimed it a Crown Colony. A governor was substituted for the High Commissioner. The Legislative Council was increased to 24 members but the relative balance remained as before since it included 12 Greeks, 3 Moslems and 9 British officials. The Legislative Council had little control over taxes, expenses, and budget, and the legislative power remained in the Crown by Orders in Council.

Cyprus, prior to British occupation, had broad local administrative autonomy. A large part of it was abolished upon occupation. When the island was proclaimed a Crown Colony, a more centralized administration went into effect. Elementary education, which had been administered by the communities, now reverted to the Colonial government and teachers became State employees. The election of local authorities was changed so that they were dependent on the Governor of the Island. Rural security became a State function. A new Penal Code and Press Law were imposed by Order in Council.

It would be idle to discuss here the unending succession of resolutions and memoranda of the Cypriote Greeks, formulating their demands for larger political rights in the local administration, for measures tending to develop the resources of the island and improve its economic situation, and the like. We need only note that the so-called "tribute," paid by the Cypriotes to the Turks, which was collected by the British since 1878 and after the complete annexation of the island in 1914, has been one of the sorest points in the relations between the two peoples. This "tribute" was discon-

tinued in 1928, and much ill feeling was created by the insistence of the Cypriotes that the unexpended surpluses of the tribute paid between 1914 and 1928 should be returned to Cyprus.

It is unnecessary to dwell further on other complaints of the Cypriote people. It is probably true that England considered Cyprus for a long time as an outpost of defense for the Suez Canal, and was not much interested in developing the island's resources and investing British money. Being off the main track of British sea communications, the island, until the present war, could not even be utilized as a naval base. England has tempted the people of Cyprus with few material advantages, and an article in *The Times* of London in 1934 could truly call it a Cinderella Colony.

V

It is evident to all who know Cyprus, including the British who have served in that Colony, that the nationalist spirit is too deeply rooted in the people themselves to be dislodged. It follows that the task of commanding their complete loyalty and devotion is too great for any foreign Power, no matter how generous and liberal that Power may be. The great majority of the Cypriote people are Greek by sentiment, Greek by language, and Greek by religion. Many generous spirits in England have raised their voices time and again to advocate the union of the island with Greece. The "Manchester Guardian" has always maintained that since the people of Cyprus prefer to live with their mother country, Greece, there is no excuse for the British to oppose this just aspiration. Arnold Toynbee, in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1932, suggested that Great Britain should follow with Cyprus the example which they had set in returning the Ionian Islands to Greece, and the American treatment of Cuba, and that the British withdraw from Cyprus after arranging that the rights of the Turkish minority be secured.

The negotiations between Mr. Venizelos and British Ministers in 1913, and the formal offer made to Greece by Britain in 1915 for the cession of Cyprus constitute official recognition of the legitimacy of Cypriote aspirations; they further show that Britain did not consider Cyprus indispensable to her national interest. If Britain in the stress of war was willing to yield, it would be an act of justice and of generosity for her to make a similar gesture after the war toward a valiant ally.

In his book, "The Truth About the Peace Treaties," Mr. Lloyd George quotes a memorandum of the War Office Staff which admitted that the great majority of the inhabitants of the island had a strong desire for unity with Greece but which advanced strategic considerations for retaining it.

"The potential strategic importance of Cyprus is great both from a naval and from an air point of view, its shores lying within 44 miles of the Anatolian and 69 of the Syrian coast, while Larnaca is only 262 miles distant from Port Said. Though the island possesses no adequate harbors at present, the Admiralty state that an excellent base for submarines and destroyers could be made at Famagusta. Facilities also exist for aerodromes and a

flying-boat base. With the increasing range of aircraft, Cyprus will be within easy striking distance of the main lines of communication through Asia Minor and Syria, and by sea, to Alexandria and the Suez Canal. Its actual importance will greatly increase should a naval base be established in the Levant by a great Power. While the possession of the island by Greece could hardly be considered a menace to the British Empire, the danger of its falling into the hands of a stronger power cannot be wholly disregarded."

Actually, the strategic importance of Cyprus to the British Empire, though at one time very real, disappeared with the acquisition of naval and air bases in Palestine. In the preparatory stages of this war, Cyprus was used neither as a naval nor an air base; in fact, no military airdrome existed on the island. The nearest enemy territory is the Dodecanese, which at the end of this war will certainly pass from Italian hands. On the other hand, the value of Cyprus to Greece will be great, for it will enable her to secure a position of equilibrium in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, this war has proved that Greece is willing to place at the disposal of the British, as she did in the case of Crete, any strategic base which they may need.

To Greece, Cyprus would be most valuable in other ways. Its attractions as a tourist center, already developed to a considerable extent, can still be greatly expanded. The harbor at Famagusta may become an important commercial and shipping center for Greece, serving the entire Middle East as it did in antiquity. There are excellent sites for both land and sea air-bases. The splendid system of roads, perhaps Britain's greatest gift to the island, makes communications to even the remotest districts ever more simple, and will greatly facilitate the establishment of a system of representative government.

Greece will need all the resources and all the energy of her children after the war in order to restore and rehabilitate herself. The 300,000 Greeks of Cyprus would be an invaluable asset to her, for it now seems that they may escape the horrors of war and of enemy occupation. Insofar as Britain has developed the island under its rule, it will be a material benefit to Greece. The fuller cooperation of the people at large with a Greek government would surely hasten further reforms; such delicate problems as that of the land holdings of the Church, which the British have been powerless to handle, could no doubt be solved by a representative Greek government.

The much-discussed question of the Moslem minority need not afford concern. The Greek government has already proved in Western Thrace that it can deal with just such a situation amicably and justly, to the complete satisfaction of all involved.

VI

This war has already done much to solve the problem of Cyprus. Upon the British declaration of war with Germany, the Archbishop of Cyprus, on behalf of the Opposition party, immediately declared a truce for the duration. Cypriotes in large numbers hastened to volunteer in the British army.

With the Italian attack on Greece, solidarity in Cyprus became complete; the Greek flag was once more flown alongside the Union Jack. A large contingent of the Cypriote forces went to Greece with the British Expedition in 1941, and many still remain there fighting with the guerrilla bands; many more fought in North Africa alongside their British comrades. Britain's aid to Greece, the fact that she has opened the doors of Cyprus to over 5,000 Greek refugees, and her magnificent victories in Africa, have all commanded new admiration from Greek Cypriotes.

The attitude of Greece has also been one of a friendly truce for the sake of complete solidarity with her great Ally. This was officially expressed by the Greek Minister of Information, Michalopoulos, who on listing Greece's few territorial claims, concluded with: "The Dodecanese will also revert to Greece, as well as another Mediterranean island, I hope, whose name for reasons of policy escapes me now."

The union of Cyprus with Greece at the close of the war would be of little material benefit to the Cypriotes. In wishing to join with the Motherland at this time, they are choosing the hard way, and they know it. The fact remains that this is what they wish to do. The advantage to them would be for some time to come a spiritual advantage only, but it would nevertheless be very great. Cypriotes are not chauvinists, but they *are* Greeks and are proud of it. Under British rule, the people of Cyprus have enjoyed low prices, low taxes, a lenient government. Yet, to travelers coming from Greece, the almost mediaeval state of Cypriote village life comes as a shock. All is there, but the goal is lacking, and that goal will only be provided by the right to take their just place, as Greeks, in the government and in the history of the Greek nation. It is the kind of goal the Allies are fighting for in this war.

Greece has played, and is playing, her part well in the present struggle. She has proved herself the staunchest European ally of the British and of the United Nations. Her claims are few; they can be summarized by the phrase: "To Greece only what is Greek." It is by no means the intention of Greece to let the problem of Cyprus stand between her and Britain today, and she has not done so. But at the close of the war, the eyes of all friends of Greece, in America and throughout the world, will be anxiously fixed on the statesmen of Great Britain. For their decision regarding this one Greek isle in the Mediterranean will go far toward symbolizing the spirit of the post-war world.*

JOHN H. YOUNG

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GREECE AND HER SHIPS

I

GREECE HAS ALWAYS looked toward the sea and lived by it. Of necessity she must continue to do so. Because of her geographical position and because of the limited resources of her land, the Greeks have been a maritime people since the earliest times. The mountains which break up the land seem to push the people into the sea, and indeed they make land travel and land communications so difficult that by comparison sea travel has always seemed simple. The land itself is so lacking in fertility that extensive agriculture is impossible. Thus the Greeks have been forced to import a large part of their food and to turn to the sea to gain their livelihood.

In Greece, the sea seems to be everywhere. The Aegean, the Ionian, and the Mediterranean all wash Greek shores, and these shores are so cut up and so strewn with islands that the sea penetrates everywhere. The coastlines and islands in turn shelter the sea and do away with the fear men have always had of vast unbroken stretches of water.

The Greeks are not such a people as would fear the sea, no matter how far it stretched. By nature they are adventurous and enterprising. Their love of adventure makes them good sailors, and added to this their capacity for enterprise makes them the best of sea-merchants.

Seamanship is an old Greek tradition. Children have been trained from the cradle to become expert sailors. It has been customary for seamen to take aboard ships and sailboats children ranging in age from 6 to 13 so as to accustom them to the sea. When an island was sighted, the children were called on deck, told the name of the island, its ports, and the most navigable routes around it. If, on the next trip, they had forgotten, they were punished. In like manner, children were thrown into the sea to teach them to swim. Nothing was overlooked in an effort to make them skillful and brave seamen.

The skill of Greeks at sea includes not only seamanship but also trading. The Greek was and is a sailor-merchant. There has never been absentee ownership of Greek ships nor have Greeks put their money in enterprises involving ships run by others. Even today, when there is a class of rich Greek shipowners owning sometimes large numbers of ships, such owners have nearly always been identified with ships and are in general successful sailor-merchants.

Nor has shipping been for the Greeks a speculative enterprise only. The Greek is a navigator in the true sense of the word. He possesses ships not only when profitable; he keeps and buys them even when shipping is passing through economic crises and is operated at a loss. The Greek has a great

attachment for a ship. He looks after it, cherishes it and is grieved by its loss. He names it after those he loves best: his mother, his wife, his child.

Shipping has been important to Greece from the dawn of history since through it Greece was provided with food. The scantiness of arable land and the overcrowding of the cities, have always forced the people to turn to the sea. Out of this arose the instinct of the Greeks to colonize.

The seafaring Greeks at the dawn of history had colonies. We know much of the period beginning about 750 B.C. when the Greeks settled both shores of the Aegean, as well as the coastline of the Black Sea, and the littoral of Southern Italy and Sicily. Pushed by their enterprising and adventurous spirit, the Greeks sailed as far as the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. Jason and the Argonauts left the shores of Greece more to explore the commercial possibilities of the Black Sea trade than to search for the legendary Golden Fleece.

After the founding of Constantinople, the Greeks dominated the commerce of the Black Sea and the area about the mouth of the Danube. Similarly, their success in the Trojan War enabled the Greeks to push their trade in the Near East. Greek ships in time sailed to the English Channel, to East Africa, to Spain, to the East Indies, and to Southern and Eastern Asia. The Greeks established a colony at Marseilles and sent boats up the Rhone and down the Loire.

The rise and fall of the Greek power have been closely associated with the changing fortunes of Greek shipping. The advice of the Delphi Oracle that wooden walls would save Greece expressed a national conviction no less than a counsel of defense against the enemy. "From the very beginnings of history that particular type of culture which for convenience we call Greek . . . has been maritime."*

The Greek merchant marine has always been of two categories: tramp boats and boats that followed fixed routes with regular cargo and passenger service. Through both, it served to spread Hellenic culture and, by the aid of Greek shipping, the Greek Colonies were able to ward off the Barbarians. Byzantium and later Constantinople remained Greek for 2,300 years and during all these years through the Bosphorus, under Greek domination, there flowed a free traffic of goods between the countries on the Black Sea and the Greek Mediterranean ports.

In particular the Mediterranean traffic remained in the hands of Greek seamen throughout the classic era as well as under the Roman Empire and the early days of the Byzantine Empire. Even the establishment of the Arabs as a naval power after the middle of the 7th century did not stop it. It is only after the 9th century that the Arab pirates, masters of Crete, began seriously to threaten Greek shipping. Subsequent to the 12th century, Venice, Genoa, and other Italian cities, as the Byzantine Empire grew weaker, took over more and more of the Mediterranean commerce.

When Byzantium fell to the Turks, the Greek shipping industry was destroyed and the merchant marine of the Italian cities and Portugal took its

* In Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th Edition, Volume 10, page 754.

place. But the Greeks were not altogether driven from the sea. Left with tiny boats only, they continued to shuttle between the islands and the mainland and after the fall of Constantinople, they rebuilt, as soon as possible, their ships and again traded across the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

II

Conscious that the liberation of Greece from the Ottoman master required a powerful merchant fleet, the islanders, in the last part of the eighteenth century, made great efforts to acquire shipping and to this end every encouragement was given Greek seamen by Greek merchants. Liberal credits were allowed. Timber merchants advanced the necessary planks, masts and spars; the iron-merchant — the nails, fastenings, chains and anchors; the dealers in marine stores — the sail and cordage; and frequently the ship-builder advanced the labor, so that vessels were built, fitted out and sent to sea without any cash outlay by the owner. The cost would be paid off in a few years from the freights, the advances meanwhile being secured by bottomry-bonds and the vessels insured against sea risks. Thus, shipbuilding was a cooperative enterprise. Even crews often operated on a profit-sharing basis.

Those who dwelt in the islands of Hydra, Spetsai and Psara were particularly active in developing the Greek merchant marine, and they were at the forefront of the struggle for independence which broke out in 1821. It was the fleet of these islands and others which provided the fighting navy and carried supplies to the armies, thus contributing powerfully to the fight for freedom. During this war the fleet was nearly destroyed. Yet Frederick Strong, Consul at Athens for the King of Bavaria and Hanover, was able to report in his book "Greece as a Kingdom," published in 1842 that:

The Greek mercantile navy, which was almost totally annihilated during the war of independence, has again risen, phoenix-like, from its ashes, owing to the industry and enterprise of its inhabitants; and the Greek flag may now be seen in almost every port from Gibraltar to Constantinople, in the Black Sea, and from Trieste to Alexandria.

He added that ships were built at Greek shipyards and although

Greek shipwrights know nothing of the theory of building, their art consisting in practice resulting from the eye

yet

their schooners are universally admitted by nautical men to be perfect models and their sailing qualities excellent.

The following table shows the development of the Greek merchant marine after the liberation of the country:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Ships</i>	<i>Tonnage</i>
1830	1,050	30,600
1841	3,200	110,000
1869	5,813	359,641
1871	6,135	419,359

The beginning of the twentieth-century found the Greek merchant marine in the process of changing from sail to steam. The first steamer, of 148 tons, was acquired in 1862. By 1873 the steam tonnage had risen to 3,000 and by 1900 it had reached 105,684 tons.

The demand for shipping in the Transvaal War gave Greek shipowners the opportunity to strengthen their financial position, and the investment of Greek capital in shipping began. In fact, stimulated by the mortgage laws of 1907, such a nation-wide interest was aroused that by 1911 the number of steamships had more than doubled and their tonnage had more than tripled, the Greek merchant marine then consisting of 343 ships of 387,634 tons.

III

By the beginning of World War I, the Greek merchant marine had increased to 475 steamers of a gross tonnage of 893,650, whereas the sailing ships had decreased in number to 888 ships, mostly of small size, since their total tonnage was down to 107,466 tons. Most of the sailing ships were engaged in intercoastal trade between the islands and the mainland.

After 1907, transoceanic liners handled the immigrant traffic between Greece and the Near East, these ships numbering six in 1914-1915. About 60 small passenger ships plied between Piraeus and the islands and outlying ports in the Peloponnesus and Western Greece. Regular passenger service was maintained between Greece and Cyprus, Syria, Alexandria, Smyrna, Constantinople and the Bulgarian ports; in addition, a passenger line ran to Brindisi and Marseilles.

In the Balkan Wars of 1912-1914, Greek merchant shipping, by supplying military transportation, contributed largely to the victory of the allied Balkan States. In fact, in the movement of Bulgarian troops from Eastern Macedonia to Thrace to join in the siege of Adrianople, 51 Greek ships, assembling in Saloniki, completed their work within 48 hours.

Until the closing of the Dardanelles by Turkey in the autumn of 1914, the Greek merchant marine (over 90% of which then consisted of cargo boats) transported cereals and lumber from the Rumanian ports on the Danube, from the Russian Black Sea and Sea of Azov ports, and from Bulgarian ports of Varna and Bourghaz to Italy, France, Spain, and North Africa, and also in smaller quantities to England and the Atlantic ports of Continental Europe. Smaller cargo ships traded between the ports of the Caucasus and the Turkish Black Sea ports, carrying case oil to South Turkish ports, Syria and Egypt, coal to Constantinople and Smyrna, and lumber to Cyprus and Egypt.

During the first World War, long before Greece was a belligerent, Greek ships were chartered to the Allies and were sent to all parts of the globe. They were particularly active in the transportation of coal from England to the Mediterranean, returning with cargoes of phosphates and iron ore for the war industries. This run kept them during the submarine warfare in dangerous waters and the Greeks suffered the highest proportion of losses incurred by any of the belligerents during the war. In all, 360 ships of a

tonnage of 767,353, or 64% of the Greek merchant fleet were sunk. Although some new ships were purchased during the war, on the day of the Armistice in 1918, Greece possessed only 290,793 tons of shipping.

IV

Thus through a whole century of independent Greece, the entire development of the Greek merchant marine was due to Greek enterprise. Except for some small and unprofitable contracts for carrying the mail to the southern islands of the Aegean, no Greek ship has ever received a government subsidy. It is doubtful whether this can be said of the shipping of any other country in the world. This is eloquent testimony to the vitality of the Greek merchant marine, and to the ability and intelligence of the Greek people.

Yet the merchant marine has contributed substantially to the Greek treasury through taxation levied by the government. Especially has it contributed to the Greek economy through the foreign balances arising from freight and passenger service rendered to foreigners.

Mindful of the peremptory need of replacing the losses of the merchant marine at the end of World War I, the Greek Government then for the first time attempted, with unfortunate results, to interfere with private initiative. In order to force Greek shipowners to acquire new tonnage, the Government made it compulsory upon all who lost ships during the war to replace them within three years. To this end the Government required shipowners to deposit with it 15% of the insurance money collected from ship losses, this sum to be forfeited to the Government if the shipowner did not replace his losses within three years. This caused shipowners to purchase ships at the wrong time, when, immediately after the war, prices were very high and great losses were suffered in the subsequent shipping crisis of 1920-1921. A case in point is a fleet of nine new ships purchased by a Greek shipping company from the British Government for £3,000,000. In 1923, this company owed the British Government a balance of £1,000,000. The British Government foreclosed and the ships were sold at auction for less than £400,000. This shipowner lost £2,000,000 while the whole Greek shipping industry lost several millions as a result of this mistaken policy of the Government.

The post-war progress of Greek shipping was thus adversely affected and it increased at a much slower pace, the period being marked by a rise in tonnage rather than an improvement in quality of ships purchased. Still the pre-war tonnage was reached again in 1925; by 1927 the steamer tonnage exceeded a million; and its subsequent progress was as follows:

Year	Steamships		Sailing Vessels		Totals	
	Number	Tonnage	Number	Tonnage	Number	Tonnage
1927	504	1,111,052	726	58,684	1,230	1,169,736
1928	528	1,256,965	729	58,508	1,257	1,315,473
1930	543	1,407,808	734	62,777	1,277	1,470,585

In 1931 the tonnage exceeded by 500,000 the pre-war level and by 1939 another million tons were added.

The mainstay of the Greek shipping industry during the post-war years was the transportation of grain from the Black Sea ports to the United Kingdom and the Continent and from the River Plate ports to the same destinations. Gradually Greek ships, as they increased in tonnage, plied to United States and Canadian ports, to India and Australia, and entered the Baltic timber and the Far Eastern soy bean trade. In fact, when World War II broke out there was hardly a shipping route where Greek ships were not engaged.

Particular mention should be made of lines operating from Antwerp and other North European ports to South European, Greek and Danubian ports as well as of the passenger line from Piraeus to New York with calls at Lisbon. When the present war broke out, arrangements were being completed for Greek lines from North Pacific ports to the United Kingdom and Continental ports and from the River Plate to Mediterranean and Black Sea ports.

Eighty per cent of the Greek ships were of the tramp class, as compared with 19% in the British and Norwegian and 7% in the Dutch merchant marine. The tonnage of 1,583,000 in 1937 of the Greek tramp ships was inferior only to the similar British tonnage of 3,826,000 and it was higher than that of any other country. In the matter of age, 6% of the Greek ships in 1939 were less than 10 years old; 16% between 10 and 20 years old; and 78% more than 20 years of age. Per capita of population, the Greek merchant marine stood sixth in the world in 1939 and in total tonnage it ranked ninth.

V

Greek merchant marine on September 1, 1939, at the outbreak of the war, was made up as follows:

- (1) 319 ocean-going cargo vessels of a total gross tonnage of 1,485,215, or of an average tonnage of 4656 and cargo carrying capacity of about 8000 dead-weight tons each.
- (2) 141 freighters of a total tonnage of 201,685, or of an average of 3000 tons, with a cargo carrying capacity of 3500 dead-weight tons each.
- (3) 70 passenger ships of a total gross tonnage of 73,455 including one Transatlantic liner of 16,900 tons gross.
- (4) 19 salvage tugs and large fishing vessels of a total tonnage of 2783 gross tons.
- (5) 710 sailing ships of over 30 registered gross tons, a large number of which were fitted with auxiliary Diesel engines.

In addition, there were a large number of small sailing ships of 30 tons or under, plying between the islands and the mainland.

Greece entered the war on the morning of the 28th of October, 1940, when she was attacked by Fascist Italy. Her merchant marine had, however, since September 1939, been in the war, and most of her ocean going

freighters had been continuously engaged in supplying much needed food and war material to England and the overseas war fronts.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that over 50% of the ocean going cargo vessels, having a tonnage of 739,758, were, up to May 20, 1942, lost, and that there have been continuous losses every month since. In particular, the Battle of Greece took a heavy toll of the Greek merchant marine in all its classes and virtually wiped out the auxiliary sailing ship fleet.

The official figures of the losses are as follows:

Losses of Greek Merchant Marine up to May 20, 1942, of the categories enumerated above.

Category No. 1

159 ocean going cargo vessels of 739,758 gross tons, over 50% of the total.

Category No. 2

110 freighters of 156,000 gross tons, or almost 80% of the total.

Category No. 3

66 passenger ships, mostly sunk in the battle of Greece whilst serving as transports or hospital ships, except 4 which were lost whilst in service with the British at Tobruk. Since a Transatlantic liner has been transferred to the British Government for use as a troop transport, only 3 ships of this category were left.

Category No. 4

The whole of this category, consisting of 19 vessels of 2783 gross tons, was lost whilst serving with the navy as mine layers or minesweepers.

Category No. 5

Over 400 vessels were lost and the remainder was captured by the enemy.

In other words, the losses amounted a year ago to nearly a million tons. Since then, the losses have increased and according to the figures of the Greek Government there were left on February 10, 1943 only 114 ocean going cargo vessels with a tonnage of 536,012. This means that 64% of this type of ship has been lost. Thus the end of the war will probably find Greece, which depends for its life on shipping, with practically no ships.

It should be noted that, since the outbreak of the war, the bulk of the Greek shipping has been placed at the service of the British Government on a time-charter agreement between the British Ministry of Shipping and the Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee. After Greece was overrun by the Axis, all its vessels were placed at the disposal of the Allied powers.

VI

In considering the post-war shipping situation in Greece we must begin with certain essential facts.

First: Greek shipping before the war offered employment to about 30,000 seamen. With their families they numbered from 150,000 to 200,000. In addition, many more Greeks were employed in occupations connected with the shipping industry. Thousands of Greek sailors gave their lives in this

war and are buried in the waters of the Seven Seas. Their courage and devotion to duty cannot be praised too much. The families of these seamen are maintained by pensions paid from a Special Fund to which employed seamen and shipowners contribute. Without a merchant marine, there would be no contributions to this Fund for the protection of the families of these Greek seamen who have given their lives in the war. On the other hand, new seamen for an increased merchant marine after the war will readily be found. The islands provide an inexhaustible supply of seamen as they have no other means of livelihood but the sea.

Second: Greece cannot live without an adequate merchant marine. She needs the ships to bring in food. She needs the income from the ships to supplement the meagre produce of her land. Also the world, and particularly the Mediterranean, the Danube and the Black Sea areas, need the Greek merchant fleet. The peoples of these regions are not navigators or sailors and they have depended on Greek shipping from the dawn of history. Thus for these peoples also the restoration of the Greek merchant marine is of prime importance.

Third: Transport problems during the post-war period emphasize this need. During the pre-war period, from 3 to 3.5 million tons of goods were brought into Greece from abroad and about 3.5 million tons were transported within the country. In the post-war period, the Greek demands upon shipping will be higher; first, because of the needs of reconstruction and secondly, because of the damage to the inland transport system. The same is true of the neighboring countries which depended on Greek shipping before the war. The condition of ports and port installations will, of course, tend to hamper transport by sea but it may be expected that the restoration of these installations will proceed with all possible speed.

As an indication of the importance of sea transport for Greece the following figures may be noted:

The traffic in 1938 was as follows:

<i>Ports</i>	<i>Number of Ships</i>	<i>Tonnage</i>	<i>Goods Transported in Tons</i>
Piraeus	19,070	13,115,400	2,814,000
Saloniki	4,249	2,941,600	888,500
Volo	3,332	1,669,200	222,400
Kavalla	1,464	559,900	117,700
Patras	6,946	3,690,100	236,200
Corfu	1,965	1,451,400	96,600
Mytilene	1,280	554,300	48,100
Herakleion	1,628	1,157,500	98,800

Greek coastal shipping was as follows:

	<i>Number of Steam Ships</i>	<i>Tonnage</i>	<i>Goods in Tons</i>	<i>Number of Sail- ing Boats</i>	<i>Tonnage</i>	<i>Goods in Tons</i>
Inward	20,215	8,622,433	699,771	15,058	771,066	676,128
Outward	20,148	8,523,375	562,113	15,620	766,635	580,645

Finally: Greece is, by nature, endowed with good natural ports, which occupy such positions that they can serve her own trade as well as that of other countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. The most important of these ports are Piraeus and Salonika. Both are safe for navigation at all times and of such depth that ships of 30 feet draft may enter. They have suitable means of loading and unloading and an adequate supply of skilled labor.

Free zones for transit trade exist in both ports. They are both connected by railway with Central Europe and the Balkan countries, the railway lines reaching to the wharves. There is ample room for the construction of additional facilities and warehouses.

In addition to such communication by land, means for the transportation of goods and passengers by sea from these Greek ports to all ports in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea are readily available. Greece before the war had 200 small cargo ships or small cargo liners for such intermediary trade between Piraeus and Saloniki on the one hand and Smyrna, Haifa, Alexandria and the Black Sea ports of Bulgaria, Rumania, Russia and Turkey on the other hand.

Additional good ports in Greece are: Volo, the commercial outlet and seaport of rural Thessaly; Kavalla in the tobacco country of Eastern Macedonia; Patras in the currant and olive oil region of Peloponnesus; Corfu in the Ionian Sea; Mytilene and Syra in the Aegean Islands; and Herakleion in Crete. It is hoped that Suda Bay may, with the rebuilding of Canea on this bay, become one of the most important Greek ports. It is probably the largest natural harbor in the Mediterranean.

In addition to the above facts, certain assumptions with respect to the general post-war picture of sea transportation may be made.

One of these assumptions is that free trade will be restored at least in certain regional economic zones, the result of which should be particularly favorable to shipping generally and therefore to Greek shipping. On the other hand, if plans for Balkan federation succeed, this should enhance the importance of the Greek ports of Piraeus, Saloniki and Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis).

Another assumption is that for a decade at least the Axis Powers will not be allowed to subsidize their merchant fleet. Thus their foreign services, which were maintained before the war on government subsidies and chiefly for war purposes rather than economic reasons, will be largely taken over by Allied merchant ships. Greece will, no doubt, without having to fight a rate war, be given an important share in such a redistribution of services.

The third assumption is that passenger traffic between the Greek islands and the mainland and passenger transportation by ships generally will be affected by air transportation. While this development will not take place until sometime after the war, it does emphasize the importance to the ship-owner of the price he pays for his ships.

VII

Bearing in mind the above facts and assumptions, we may now approach the problem of the reconstruction of the Greek merchant marine. It will be recognized at once that Greece must be placed in a position to re-create her merchant fleet within the shortest possible time and, indeed, immediately upon liberation. But even the restoration of the Greek merchant marine to its pre-war size will not suffice to enable Greece to resume its pre-war position in the field of world transportation.

If the Greek merchant marine is to satisfy the needs of post-war Greek trade and to handle its share of world trade, what must be its size? The following estimates are made by experienced Greek shipowners and others:

(1) Fifty modern fast liners, large and small, the large liners to ply from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to North and South America and the small liners to run between the Continental Atlantic ports and the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Ports, with shuttle lines from Syria, Palestine, Cyprus and Egypt to the Greek, Turkish and Rumanian ports.

(2) Twenty-five small passenger boats for Greek inter-coastal and island service. These could be built in Greece if suitable materials, such as pre-fabricated steel and Diesel engines were obtainable.

(3) Thirty tankers, both large and small, to carry oil to the bunkering ports. In view of the number of coal conversion plants in Germany and England, and since fuel oil is available in Rumania, the Caucasus, Egypt and Syria, coal as a fuel may well, after the war, become an anachronism. It is not unlikely, therefore, that most of the ships will use oil in connection with Diesel or steam turbines. This will increase considerably the Greek consumption of fuel oil and will require the thirty tankers above mentioned as compared with the four tankers possessed by the Greek merchant marine before the war.

(4) 500 tramp ships to replace the Greek losses during this war. Liberty ships and existing English standard vessels might be drawn upon to provide these tramp ships.

(5) Twenty tugs and salvage boats and special craft, all vessels of this type having been lost during the war.

(6) 500 sailing ships, all such ships having likewise been sunk during the war.

The ways and means of making this shipping available to Greece at the end of the war present a most difficult problem. But some solution of the problem must be found since the rebuilding of the Greek merchant marine is probably the most important post-war task which faces Greece.

The only money available to Greece for the purchase of ships is the proceeds of insurance policies paid to Greek shipowners in connection with the sinking of Greek ships. This money will be used for replacements but on the basis of today's building costs it is not sufficient. The Union of Greek shipowners estimates that the following additional amounts will be needed for the acquisition of new ships of the four main categories above outlined:

\$ 75,000,000 for category (1)
12,000,000 for category (2)
30,000,000 for category (3)
250,000,000 for category (4)

The acquisition of these ships is of paramount importance to Greece. In the past the Greeks have obtained their ships by building them or purchasing them secondhand in England, but building costs in England today are 85% over pre-war costs and building costs in the United States are much higher.

Because of its slow speed, the Liberty type of freighter is not the ship for which the long range program of the Maritime Commission calls, and it has been built on such a large scale that at the end of the war a considerable number of Liberty ships will have to be sold. The Greek shipowners will be interested in these ships. A reasonable price and a low interest rate with long term amortization would permit Greek shipowners to obtain these ships and operate them successfully in competition with the rest of the world. What has been said of the Liberty ships applies with equal force to the English standard vessels built during the war.

Small and slow freighters, passenger ships and liners, salvage boats and sailing vessels do not figure in the post-war shipping programs of the United States or England. It may be hoped that a number of ships of these types may, by way of reparations, be made available to Greece from the merchant fleets of the Axis Powers. Moreover, in view of the tremendous task of reconstruction facing Greece at the end of the war, Greece will require long term loans at low rates, if it is to acquire the shipping it needs.

To round out the needs of post-war Greece, a number of transport planes should be turned over to Greece as it will have to adopt air transportation, particularly from the mainland to the islands, and also elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean.

VIII

The acquisition of a new merchant marine will not completely solve the shipping problems of Greece. In most maritime countries, such services as shipbuilding, ship repairing, marine insurance and bunkering depots are deemed essential to a complete shipping system. Such services the Greeks have in the past obtained chiefly in England. In Greece only ship repairing and dry docking facilities were available, but the former met only one fourth of the requirements and the latter were wholly inadequate.

After the war Greece should have new and complete repair bases. They would give work to the people and would also serve as auxiliary bases for the whole Eastern Mediterranean zone. Suda Bay in Crete could and should be properly equipped with machine repairing shops and floating dry-docks and the Syra base similarly extended. Corfu or Argostoli (Cephalonia) in the Ionian Sea and Saloniki might well be similarly equipped. Such equipment may be found in the surplus war stocks.

Shipbuilding facilities, especially for small passenger ships and small Diesel cargo boats, could easily be set up in Greece. It is likely that war shipbuilding and ship repair plants will be dismantled in the United States and some installations may be sent to Greece. It would not pay for Greece to buy entirely new equipment. The sum of \$10,000,000 under these conditions would, it is estimated, secure the necessary facilities for both ship repairing and shipbuilding.

In the bases named above, especially Suda Bay, fuel oil depots may be established, providing facilities for international, as well as for Greek shipping. Oil companies may be induced to construct the necessary tanks, the ownership of which would, after a term, vest in the Greek Government.

American public opinion is agreed that, when the war in Europe is ended, America should do what it can to bring it to pass that the peoples of those lands which have been overrun by the Axis should become self-supporting as soon as possible, and that normal trade relations should be promptly resumed. So far, this public opinion has expressed itself in favor of supplying such peoples with food and agricultural machinery. Is it not logical to extend this aid so that, in the case of countries which, like Greece, have a moderate need for agricultural machinery but great need for shipping, they be supplied with ships? Not only will such a course enable the Greek people to become self-supporting, but it will also result in the restoration, at the earliest possible date, of normal commercial relations and of world trade. The adoption of such a course will, I am sure, when the time arrives, commend itself both to the Government and to the people of the United States.*

WILLIAM M. CHADBOURNE

* Grateful acknowledgment is made to Miss Gloria Ross of Wellesley College for the statistical information included in parts III and IV, and to the Union of Greek Ship-owners for the information set forth in parts V and VI, as well as for the estimates of reconstruction requirements of the Greek Merchant Marine and as to the methods to be pursued in re-creating it.

THE POST-WAR ECONOMIC WELFARE OF GREECE

THE PHYSICAL AND human disaster suffered by Greece in this war as a result of the Axis aggression and the occupation of the land is so crushing and extensive that the country and her people will probably never revert to the pre-war condition unless Greece is aided both indirectly by the establishment of a new world order of cooperation and mutual assistance, and directly by such measures as will tend to repair her losses, restore her economy and rehabilitate her life. Part of this direct aid may be given under the general relief and reconstruction machinery which is being organized by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. A Coordinating Committee of American Agencies in Greece has been preparing for the past year, reports and findings on the various aspects of Greek relief and reconstruction and these have been filed with the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation and other government authorities in Washington.

In addition to such aid as may be given in relief and reconstruction, the rehabilitation of Greece requires other measures affecting more fundamentally her economic welfare. It is proposed to submit here certain suggestions in this regard which it is hoped may be of some assistance both to the Greek Government and to her Allies in considering these problems with the view to post-war settlements.

I

A foreword on the Greek economy generally is first necessary. No integrated scientific study on Greek economy as a whole has ever been made although valuable studies have been prepared by Greek economists for particular branches of the economy. Some fifteen years ago a Supreme Economic Council was established in Greece as an economic adviser to the government and thus began a systematic study of the economic problems of the country. The recommendations of the Council have been carried out in certain respects but the political and international disturbances of these years prevented action in most cases.

A systematic attention to the economic problems of the country and the execution of a long range program either by the people themselves or by the government have been impossible in the past due to fundamental difficulties of the Greek State. For a whole century of independent life, modern Greece struggled with the problem of liberating the unredeemed parts of Hellenic territory. The national policy for the solution of this problem had not only a sentimental content, to liberate the Greeks under foreign domination, but an economic content as well.

At the issue of the war of liberation in 1830, Greece included only about 650,000 people living in a land four-fifths of which was rocks and mountains. They struggled for expansion both to liberate the enslaved Greeks and to increase the land out of which the people could maintain themselves. It was only in 1881, after many costly attempts that Greece acquired Thessaly with fertile plains that added to the food of the people. And it was only in 1912-1913 that Epirus, Macedonia and the Aegean Islands were liberated. The attempt to expand to the Asia Minor Coast in 1922 was disastrous, and the net result was to add a million and a half refugees to the population of Greece.

Through all this century, then, the chief objective of the Greek State was the liberation of Greek lands from Turkish domination. The State was only a means to the accomplishment of this object. It was a temporary stage and not a condition calling for economic planning for any measurable future. The life of the nation has been a continuous series of emergencies to be confronted or of impending disasters to be avoided and measures were adopted hurriedly to meet the emergency or disaster often against the more permanent interests of the country.

The national foreign policy no less than the poverty of the land made the economic life of Greece dependent on foreign countries. Anxious to secure the support of the Great Powers in its foreign policy, it sought to satisfy their interests by contradictory measures with the result that the economy of the country became a battleground between different spheres of interests. On the other hand, the exigencies of its foreign policy, mobilizations, wars and the insufficiency of domestic resources led the country to the foreign loan markets.

An enormous foreign public debt has plagued the country since the beginning of its independence and its economy had to sustain the service of huge debts. The public debt on March 31, 1940 amounted to nearly 95 billion drachmas. At that time, the Greek drachma was pegged to both the pound sterling and the gold dollar at around 150 drachmas to the dollar. Accordingly, the above debt was equivalent to about \$630,000,000 of which all but \$100,000,000 was in foreign currency. It has been estimated that the per capita foreign debt service for Greece before the war amounted to 30.40% Gold Francs against 7.96 for Bulgaria, 8.50 for Rumania and 4.70 for Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the claim of the foreign debt on the national income was 9.25% for Greece, as against 2.98% for Bulgaria, 2.32% for Rumania and 1.68% for Yugoslavia.

We shall now outline the various branches of Greek economy.

II. Agriculture

The country has been characterized as agricultural. This is true in the sense that agriculture furnishes by far the largest part of the national income, 23 billion drachmas in 1938 out of a total of 50 billion. And the picture becomes more emphatic if animal husbandry is included in agricultural economy, for this represented another 13 billion drachmas in the na-

tional income. However, agriculture in the restricted sense, in the meaning of cultivation of the land for cereals and other grains, is less important. Its production represented in 1938 one-half of the above figure of 23 billions. This characterization should be taken in a very restricted sense. The proportion of land in Greece available for cultivation is signally limited. A paper published in "Soil Science" in 1922 by Professor George Bouyoucos of the Michigan State College, "A Study of the Fertility of the Soils of Greece" as a result of a study conducted in Greece by himself and Professor Cyril G. Hopkins of the University of Illinois, states:

"Greece is a very mountainous country, more than half of the area consisting of mountains. The agricultural land is situated on plateaus or broad mountain tops of mountain ranges, on gradual slopes of high mountains, on hills and ridges, on river and inter-mountain valleys, on basins, valley deltas, piedmont slopes, inter-mountain and coastal plains. The number of large plains is small and these are found mainly in Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace. There are few in Peloponnesus but they are not so extensive in area. A large portion of the agricultural land of the country is located on hills and rock mountains. Big mountains more than a thousand feet high, very steep and rocky, are being farmed. The land on the slopes of these mountains is actually made by the farmers themselves. They make patches of land by digging out the rocks or cultivating between the rocks. In order to keep the soil from being washed away these mountains are terraced with stone walls. The farmers abandon beautiful valleys and plains and go to farm these rock mountains because their soils are newer and more productive.

"On account of the mountainous and hilly nature of the country, and in view of the fact that the rainfall comes usually in torrents, much erosion and gulying takes place on the agricultural land. These processes of erosion and gulying are considerably facilitated by the fine texture of the soil."

It should be noted that the production of cereals is an important part of the whole agricultural production because it is the main source of the food for the population. Yet, as the study by Prof. Bouyoucos and Professor Hopkins showed, the average yield of grain crops is low due to poor seeds, the insufficient rainfall in the late spring and in the summer and the low content of the nitrogen and phosphorus in most of the common soils. This last defect was partly cured by the more common use of fertilizers and experiments with better seeds in the last ten years and still the increase of production barely covered seventy per cent of consumption. Thirty per cent of grains needed for the food of the people had to be imported before the war, but in the period of her greatest prosperity Greece imported food.

The agricultural products on which Greece bases her hopes for the creation of an export trade are mainly tobacco, raisins, wines and olive oil. These represent one-half of the total value of agricultural production in Greece. These are luxury products that depend upon foreign markets and have been meeting with the competition of products of economically stronger countries. A recent attempt was made to increase the production of cotton and normally this should suffice for the needs of domestic production.

In recent years much was done in Greece to increase the output of agriculture generally. Drainage works particularly in certain regions of northern Greece have restored to cultivation some fertile lands. Much still remains to be done for further improvement particularly irrigation to supplement the insufficient rainfall, and a larger use of scientific fertilizers to supply the elements of nitrogen and phosphorus that the soil lacks.

The greatest need, however, is for foreign markets to absorb the surpluses of Greek luxury products such as tobacco, raisins, olive oil and wines. These are the principal means by which a dependent country like Greece can pay for its imports.

There are certain other elements entering the picture of agriculture. Greece is not self-sufficient in livestock and in its products. Of the total value of animal husbandry estimated in 1938 at 13,800,000,000 drachmas, we must deduct value of work of animals of four billion and of manure used of two billion. Of the remainder, livestock represented a little over two billion and milk, cheese and butter another three billion. The policy of the country in stock-breeding has not been uniform and its efforts have been handicapped by the structure of the country. A large room for improvement exists and international assistance is indispensable. The same observation applies to the products of forests and of fisheries. The food of the population depends to an important degree on the products of the sea, yet no important industry developed in this field.

III. *Industry*

Industry is the second important branch of Greek economy representing, as it does, thirteen and a half billion drachmas, on a total national income of fifty billion. According to the Supreme Economic Council, "the main purpose of Greek industry is to supply home consumption," yet an appreciable export trade was also built on it in the years immediately preceding the present war.

Industrial production did not really begin in Greece until the end of the 19th century and the country did not really become conscious of it until the first World War. The main impetus was given to industry after the influx of the Greek refugees from Turkey. Several factors combined in bringing about this result. First, it was a search for occupational escape for a surplus of population that the land could not maintain. Secondly, among the refugees there were entrepreneurs who headed industries in Asia Minor and transferred to Greece their managerial capacity as well as their capital. Thirdly, the tariff walls gradually raised throughout the world in the late twenties caused Greece also to seek national self-sufficiency.

Taking industrial production of 1928 as the basis, the index increased in 1933 to 111.79; in 1935 to 143.17; and in 1939 to 179%. The volume of domestic industrial products rose from 58.61% in 1928 to 74.41% in 1937 and the number of imported manufactured goods declined correspondingly from 41.37% to 23.59% in the same period.

Industrial activity may be broadly distinguished on the kind of raw materials used: domestic, imported semi-fabricated materials and imported raw materials. The main industries using domestic raw materials are those of food processing, cotton and silk factories. While these supply home consumption they are also the main export industries, and insofar as they are luxury products (cigarettes, olive oil, canned goods, wines) they suffer from the difficulties indicated above.

However, the expansion of industry in Greece brought about a corresponding increase in the cultivation and output of domestic raw materials thus reducing its dependency on external markets. The following table compiled by the Supreme Economic Council shows this progress in the utilization of raw materials.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Domestic Raw Materials used by Industry</i>	<i>Foreign Raw Materials</i>
1928	56.85%	43.15%
1933	62.47	37.53
1935	63.11	36.89
1936	64.90	35.10
1937	70.98	29.02

To all kinds of industry in Greece we find attached a very serious disadvantage — that of lack of fuel. Almost all the fuel needed to run the industrial machine is imported. In 1938, Greece had to export foreign exchange of £1,500,000 on coal and coke alone — not to mention petroleum, benzine and lubricating oils. These imports are supplemented by the use of indigenous lignite. The subsoil is rich in lignite but it requires special equipment (boiler grates) for its utilization which industry lacks. Increased production of lignite and its use in industry should be one of the objectives of Greek economy.

Although the need for imported raw materials and the need for fuel constitute serious handicaps to the whole industrial effort, industry is indispensable to Greece for the production of vital necessities of the population which cannot be imported without an additional heavy burden on the economic potentialities of the country. Dependence of Greece for these necessities on foreign countries would also deprive the home labor of working opportunities which is an essential element in a country poor in land resources and with an excess of population.

We must now make another distinction based on the kind of products manufactured: durable, semi-durable and perishable goods. Greek industry is mainly concerned with the last two categories of products. No heavy industry worthy of its name exists. Nor is there any present need for such industry in Greece since the mineral products at present exploited are not quantitatively important. It is true that those mineral products that are mined are exported and are re-imported to Greece in the form of manufactured or semi-fabricated products, but this is not a sufficient reason for the establishment of a heavy industry.

Much hope has been placed from time to time on the development of hydraulic power in Greece for the production of electricity capable of giving motive power for her industry. The total of hydro-electric forces in Greece has been estimated at about 2,250,000,000 Kwh. Of this total only 220,000,000 Kwh. are now used. The exploitation of the potential would nearly eliminate the need of coal. The non-exploitation of the water power in Greece is due to several reasons: the supply of water in most instances is unstable and the building of dams and levees is needed, requiring investment of large capital unavailable in Greece. Such investment and building must proceed simultaneously with the creation of substantial industries so that there will be sufficient stable consumption to permit of economical operation.

Greece possesses mineral resources, particularly of chromite, bauxite, magnesite, manganese ores, iron ores, nickel ores, and also silver, lead, emery, zinc, copper, iron pyrites, sulphur and marble. The manufacture of these minerals has not been seriously undertaken and the country had to export them as raw materials. Before the war, Greece was a considerable exporter of chromite, bauxite, magnesite, and other ores. In 1938, from the export of iron ores, magnesite, chromite, manganese and nickel ores alone, Greece obtained £734,500, a sum equal to one-half of the sum exported in foreign exchange for the importation of coal and coke.

In the last years before the war a comparatively large proportion of the Greek metal trade, other than iron ore, was done with the United States. Towards the end of 1939, a rolling mill plant was brought into Greece by a company formed in the United States by Greek emigrants but by reason of delays in installation operations had not started by the time the Axis started its attack on Greece.

More important in its promise to Greek economy was the concession granted by Greece about the same time to a subsidiary of American Cyanamid Company for the exploitation of the force of the Acheloos River calculated at 820,000,000 Kwh. yearly which would permit the creation of electric power to process the rich in aluminum deposits of bauxite of Mount Parnassus — a mineral exported as raw material before the war to Germany, United States, Japan and Great Britain. This would also permit the development of metallurgical industries.

IV. Foreign Trade

The picture of the agricultural and industrial situation in Greece described above emphasizes the significance of foreign trade in Greek economy and leaves no question that the balance of trade must be unfavorable. In spite of concerted efforts to reduce the gap between imports and exports either by restrictions or by more extensive use of domestic products, Greece's adverse trade balance appeared with persistent regularity. The table below illustrates this particularly since it refers to recent years when the policy of national self-sufficiency and restrictions of importations were in full force:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports</i> (in millions of drachmas)	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Adverse Balance</i>
1933	8,431.5	5,141.0	3,290.5
1934	8,792.4	5,474.2	3,318.2
1935	10,681.4	7,101.3	3,580.1
1936	11,962.6	7,378.8	4,583.8
1937	15,204.3	9,555.3	5,649.0

This is the result of the condition of Greek economy with the unavoidable demand for certain imports, particularly wheat, manufactured goods and raw materials and the nature of its exports which are mostly luxury products, the so-called expensive Mediterranean crops. Seventy-five per cent of the value of Greek exports were such products while tobacco alone represented 50% of the total value of exports. Tariff walls, quota restrictions and competition by great powers have put great obstacles to the exports of Greece, while at the same time the same powers insisted on Greece's maintaining the service of her foreign loans.

The pre-war international economic system tended to restrict the foreign trade of poor countries like Greece, though trade is a necessary complement of the inadequacy of land and other resources. These artificial impediments to the economic life and activity of small countries like Greece is comparable to making war on them and taking from them a part of their territory.

V. Emigrant Remittances, Merchant Marine and Tourism

Three other elements of Greek economy should be noted briefly.

1. Emigrants' remittances, especially from the United States, have long been an important factor of support to the always strained economy. In the years 1933 to 1937, these remittances from abroad were as follows:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Remittances in Gold Francs</i>	<i>Index</i>
1933	77,597,000	100
1934	45,500,000	58.63
1935	32,330,000	41.66
1936	55,376,000	71.40
1937	91,245,000	117.59

In earlier years much more substantial amounts were received by Greece and it may be said that this factor, significant though it still was before the present war, lost the great importance it had in previous years. The restriction of immigration by the United States of America, especially, and in general by the whole world diminished this income for Greece at its source. Greeks abroad settled permanently in their new country and ceased to a certain degree to support individuals or institutions in Greece. Lastly, the economic difficulties of the country gave rise to measures which frightened foreign investors. More than once the purse of the Greeks abroad was hard hit and the system of exchange control deprived the country of deposits at Greek banks.

2. Tourism, as a substantial source of income, was not developed in

Greece until the last ten years before the war, with the establishment of a special Government Department, building of roads and hotels and able publicity campaigns. The result was the addition to the balance of payments of an amount of between £1,200,000 to £3,000,000 a year in favor of Greece.

3. The Greek merchant marine is the country's greatest asset in the picture of the economic balance. In war and peace, the Greek merchant marine has always been an active element. The existence and survival of this element in the Greek economy has not been the result of international cooperation; quite the contrary, it suffered from the competition of stronger fleets. The explanation of this and the importance of the Greek merchant marine for the future of Greece is being discussed elsewhere in this book. It is sufficient to note here that the income of the merchant marine in the pre-war years amounted to between £7,500,000 and £10,000,000 yearly but only a portion of this was imported into Greece as foreign exchange, because the Greek merchant marine remained tributary to foreign markets for most of the services, such as shipbuilding, ship repairing, fuel, insurance, etc.

VI

The above outline of the condition of Greek economy suggests certain observations on the post-war situation.

There has been much discussion of regionalism in the Balkans and it is very probable that the idea will bear fruit at the end of the war. It may be doubted, however, whether economic collaboration between the Balkan countries will begin to solve Greece's economic difficulties. Her economy and those of the other Balkan countries do not complement each other. Of the total exports of each Balkan country, only an insignificant percentage usually goes to other Balkan countries. Greece bought only 17% of the 500,000 tons of wheat she needs from the other Balkan countries, although they could meet her total requirements. Yet even so, Greece bought from these countries every year many times as much as she sold to them. The fact is that her economic welfare is dependent upon the world market. Many of her luxury products cannot find a market in the Balkan countries.

This does not mean that there is no room for Balkan cooperation in the economic field. A greater part of Balkan produce could be consumed within the Balkans with the establishment of a total or partial customs union, of a Balkan monetary union and other means of cooperative action. Also, the cut-throat competition of certain Balkan products, particularly tobacco produced in Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, could be eliminated on the European markets by joint action. Lastly, regional arrangements might allow for a greater opportunity for better utilization of the Balkan soil and rational distribution of special cultures.

It follows that, while economic regionalism in the Balkans is highly desirable, Greece must depend on wider international cooperation and on international economic relations built upon expanding national prosperity.

Greece should be enabled, in the matter of agriculture, to develop her specialized cultures such as tobacco, raisins, olive oil, wines and fruits which are particularly fitted to her soil and should be ensured foreign markets for the export of these products. In exchange, Greece may rely on the importation of wheat and other grains instead of attempting to become self-sufficient in cereals, the production of which her soil and climatic condition render uneconomic. Insofar, however, as the available land resources permit, the people should be enabled by the ampler use of fertilizers, irrigation and drainage works and development of livestock, to achieve a more adequate income.

And in the field of industry, Greece should be enabled to develop small home industries based on domestic raw materials both for the purpose of satisfying essential needs of her people and also of creating employment for a large part of her population that cannot live from the soil. Canning factories, milk products industries, oil refineries, establishments for wood, furniture, paper and household goods, and metallurgical industries should be easy of establishment in Greece on an economic basis. Heavy industries are not an objective of the immediate future. Capital does not exist for the exploitation of even the minor mineral ores which are exported, and surveys have not yet been completed of the mineral resources in the northern regions. It is important however, that the country be assured of full exploitation and use of her deposits of lignite and that her hydro-electric forces be gradually developed in order that Greece may be partly relieved from her complete dependence on imported fuel.

How may international action permit Greece to achieve these modest improvements which will rehabilitate the country, raise the standard of living of her people and gradually improve the health and strength that have been sapped by poverty and starvation during the Axis occupation?

The preparation of detailed plans for the post-war period is necessarily a matter for experts of the Greek government with detailed and local knowledge of possible developments and probable needs. All that can be stated as a general principle is the desirability of having such plans in hand and we have no doubt that these are being worked out.

For our part, we can only suggest some general features of present conditions. The question of the foreign debt of Greece is paramount. It will be impossible at the end of the war for Greece to bear the burden of a foreign debt of about 80 billion drachmas or 640 million dollars. There will be no purchasing power to gather back by taxation. The launching of an urgently needed program of civilian rehabilitation can only be carried out if the government credit is unimpaired and the State can rely on using the resources of the people for domestic uses. The Greek Government in 1932 stopped paying full interest on its foreign indebtedness and stopped all amortization of foreign and domestic debts. It seems obvious, then, that since the prospect of Greece's being able to make full payment on her foreign debt for many years to come is remote, it will be necessary to refund the debt at a lower figure with a small interest and deferred amortization.

A definite understanding and declaration on this would lift the credit of

the Greek state and permit private funds to be made available in Greece for the restoration of the country.

The question of lend-lease indebtedness insofar as Greece is concerned should also be obvious. The character of these transactions is such that no monetary loans were made or will be made to Greece. Goods are or will be supplied to her in kind. No one can foresee at this stage what the final terms of settlement of these transactions will be. But we should not be too daring to hope that the United States and Great Britain will not hesitate to supply the needs of Greece's still fighting people and help in the immediate reconstruction of the country without any expectation of repayment by Greece. On the other hand, for a long-range program of rehabilitation, Greece should be supplied in kind and in money by long term loans at small interest by her powerful Allies. Greece would prefer this solution in order that ample resources may be placed in her hands since lend-lease supplies for immediate relief and reconstruction alone will not solve her problem.

A third observation concerns the problem of restitution and reparation by Germany, Italy and Bulgaria. Greece will have an account with these countries. The ruthless murder of innocent hostages, the destruction of her cities and towns, the looting of her foodstuffs and raw materials and the carrying away by right of conquest of the contents of institutions, railroad stock, motor vehicles, industrial machinery and the like, cannot be forgotten. True, peace and prosperity cannot be built on vengeance and hatred, however justified, nor can the terrible cost of this war be met by the exaction of tribute. It is the general consensus of opinion on the part of economists that punitive reparations will not be enforced at the end of this war.

Yet there is a real case for insisting upon some restitution and upon requiring the Axis Powers to bear a share of the costs of reconstruction. This should be particularly exacted on behalf of countries like Greece which are too weak economically and do not have the recuperative powers of stronger nations capable of meeting the costs of reconstruction by the force of their inherent economic strength.

It would not be unduly difficult to work out plans at the end of the war by which Axis materials should be used for the rebuilding of factories, towns and establishments and the replenishing of stocks destroyed or looted in Greece. Also, by way of restoration, the Axis Powers should be compelled to transfer physically to Greece small factories and installations which will permit of the creation of industries which Greece is badly in need of as described above. This is only equitable and indeed a mild form of restitution to a nation that has been strangled and robbed by the conquerors of her soil.

The Atlantic Charter holds out the hope of freedom from want for small countries like Greece. It is earnestly believed that the above suggestions are proper means of ensuring to Greece the beginning of the realization of this hope.*

ABBOTT P. USHER

* The writer has received the assistance of Greek students graduating in economics in the collection of statistical information and other data for this study.

GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN POST-WAR GREECE

ON THE LIBERATION of Greece, the government will be confronted with a herculean task. The problems — social, economic, financial — to be met in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country will call for statesmanship of the first order. The friends of Greece who are familiar with its pre-war history frankly express great anxiety on this score. The serious depletion in the political ranks caused by deaths during the last years before the war and by the systematic arrest and killing of intellectual and political leaders by the Axis forces of occupation in Greece have created a situation where tried and intelligent leadership may be found lacking. In the past, the nation has produced miraculous surprises, as for instance in 1910 with the appearance on the political scene of an unknown Cretan who proved to be the foremost statesman of modern Greece: Eleutherios Venizelos. The vitality which the Greek people exhibited in the present trials encourages us to believe that new leaders will arise among the people to lead the country to revival.

It is to be hoped that at least the question of the political regime — monarchy versus Republic, will be permitted to be decided upon at an early time after liberation so that it will not bring a revival of the irrepressible conflict that has plagued the political life in Greece during the larger part of the interval between the two world wars.

Possibly, it will not be amiss to review here this recent political history of Greece for the lessons that it may have for post-war Greece. To the friends of Greece the political history of the quarter century from 1915 to 1940 is well-known.* It may conveniently be divided into six phases. The first covers the conflict between King Constantine and the foremost Greek statesman, Mr. Eleutherios Venizelos, over the question of the entry of Greece into the first World War, and terminated with the expulsion of the King by the Allies in June 1917 and the triumph of the interventionist policy of Venizelos.

The second phase is the period of participation of Greece in that World War with the triumph of the Greek arms on the Balkan front and is concluded with the general elections of November 1920, a few months after the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, which confirmed the fondest hopes of the Greeks by the cession to their country of most of the irredenta territories to which they aspired. Resentful of the domestic policy carried on by Mr. Venizelos' lieutenants in Greece, the people in these elections defeated

* See Nicholas S. Kaltchas, *Introduction to the Constitutional History of Greece*, Columbia University Press, 1940, pp. 148 ff.

Venizelos and soon thereafter by an overwhelming plebiscitary vote recalled King Constantine and restored him to his throne. The third phase is the period of the campaign in Asia Minor undertaken by Venizelos' successors even after the withdrawal of Allied support. The campaign ended in a military disaster in September 1922 and was followed by the abdication of the King and the influx of more than a million refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. The fourth phase is the short-lived reign of George II, Constantine's son. With the help of the pronounced Venizelist and anti-monarchist sympathies of the refugees who were new voters in Greece, the reign of King George was cut short and the Republic was proclaimed and ratified by a plebiscite in April 1924.

A new phase in the political life in Greece is the Republican regime from 1924 to 1935. Because of its origins, the Republic became identified with the statesman who, since 1915, has been the King's foremost antagonist, and precisely because the Republic was synonymous with the Venizelist party, it did not command the allegiance of the other half of the Greek people who retained their loyalty to the memory of King Constantine and were hostile to Venizelos. Indeed, Venizelos himself was not a believer in the Republic and accepted it only as a way out of the revolutionary situation created by the Asia Minor disaster. Had he withdrawn from active politics, a consummation desired by his own lieutenants who were anxious to make the Republic acceptable to the anti-Venizelist section of the Greek people, Greece would probably have remained a Republic to the end. The tragedy is that Venizelos remained in active politics. This and the blows the Republic received in 1933 and 1935 by Republican military leaders in military coups following elections that had failed to give a majority to the Venizelist party, brought about the restoration of the monarchy in 1935.

The return of King George in November 1935 was greeted by the Greek people with a real sense of relief. Venizelos himself endorsed him and most of the other Republican leaders followed suit. Peace and order accompanied the King's return to the throne. But the task of forming a parliamentary government proved arduous. A coalition government had to govern Greece in view of the division of the Parliament into too many small parties. At the same time, death was busy among political leaders. By an impressive coincidence, the protagonists of the political scene of the past died within the short space of a few months. The result was that the most important parties were deprived of their chiefs and party discipline was more difficult to maintain.

It is at this stage that General Metaxas, as Vice-President of the Ministerial Council, succeeded to the Premiership on the death of Mr. Demerdjis. Although the leader of a very small parliamentary group, he succeeded in passing through Parliament a resolution adjourning it for five months and transferring its legislative functions to a permanent parliamentary commission on which all parties were represented. At the end of three months, Metaxas, invoking the threat of a general strike by the communist party, obtained the King's signature in August 1936 to decrees suspending the

Constitutional guarantees of civil rights, dissolving the Parliament indefinitely and ultimately establishing the dictatorship which was to last until his death.

His coup ushered in a new period of conflict between democracy and reaction which should not necessarily have impinged upon the King except insofar as, having once acquiesced in Metaxas' coup, he allowed himself to become prominently identified with the dictatorship. Whether or not the King did so, whether or not the Metaxas dictatorship was, at first, rooted in popular approval or acceptance in view of long internal instability and external dangers threatening Greece, are matters on which those who claim to speak for the Greek people are in vehement disagreement. Events are too fresh to allow a detached judgment.

However, the following points are generally not in dispute. The Metaxas dictatorship obtained in the beginning the allegiance of a certain part of the public insofar as it purported to prepare the country militarily for its defense against aggression. As to whether in fact it took advantage of its opportunities to strengthen the defense of the country, there is much doubt. On the other hand, like all dictatorships, that of Metaxas resorted to measures of repression and these, for a people so fundamentally and traditionally democratic and passionately attached to freedom as the Greek people are, caused so deep a revulsion that at the present time all persons who have been in any way associated with that regime are looked upon with suspicion by the Greeks in Greece and abroad and their complete elimination from the government is insistently demanded.

The second point is that foreign influence had no part in the restoration of monarchy in Greece in 1935. Though the restoration synchronized with the Anglo-Italian conflict over Ethiopia, there was no pro-British or pro-Italian party in Greece. While the assumption is warranted that the restoration was favored by Britain both for dynastic reasons and because a united Greece was needed on the anti-Axis front, it is very difficult to say that the British wishes in the matter influenced Greek opinion. All that can be said with certainty is that the longing for national unity in the midst of a perilous international situation must have contributed to the restoration of the monarchy and the subsequent toleration of the Metaxas dictatorship. On the other hand, there are many facts indicating that at least the representatives of the British Government in Greece interested in a strong government in the country for the anti-Italian front welcomed the Metaxas dictatorship and were interested in its consolidation and continuation.

The third point is that whatever may be the judgment of history on the Metaxas dictatorship and the King's connection with it, the Greek people have the right to render their verdict freely and without outside influence from any quarter and they should be able to do so immediately upon liberation and as soon as a plebiscite may be conducted with the greatest freedom and impartiality. This is one of the freedoms guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter and consonant with the democratic ideals for which this war is being fought.

There was much agitation among the Greeks in exile and, it appears, also in occupied Greece, for a clear assurance on this point. Recently, the King himself and the Greek Government in exile made declarations that, in good faith, should afford this assurance and by the same token restore complete unity among the fighting Greeks within and outside Greece.

In a broadcast from Cairo to the people of Greece on July 4, the King appealed to all Greeks for political unity and made four clear and distinct promises. First, that as soon as the seat of the Greek government can be transferred to Greek soil, the members of the present government in exile will tender their resignations. Secondly, that a coalition government fully representative of all parties and all currents of public opinion will then be constituted, the government to be composed of personalities whose presence will guarantee the freedom and orderliness of general elections. Thirdly, that this government will conduct free elections for a Constituent Assembly within six months after liberation of the country. Lastly, that this Assembly will freely decide on the political regime and that he, the King, will be the first to respect whatever decision the assembly might make about the future political regime in Greece.

The head of the Greek government next day fully endorsed on behalf of the entire cabinet this declaration and the assurances of the King, and expressed his gratification that the serious dispute among the Greeks on the problem of monarchy or Republic will be definitely and freely decided by the people. There is no doubt that this declaration by the King, in which he admits the existence of a division of opinion on the maintenance of the royal institution and promises to abide by the decision of the people was significant and timely. It does not seem, however, to have completely satisfied the democratic elements in Greece who insist that the King should not return to Greece, with the Greek Government, but wait until a plebiscite has been held.

There are indications that a solution satisfying all parties may soon be found which will permit of an orderly solution of the problem. It is hoped that guarantees of free elections for a Constituent Assembly or of a genuine plebiscite may be found so that the result may not be falsified. There are people, military or civilian officers, who have vested interests in the regime that placed them in office and if we judge from previous instances in the recent history of Greece, they may attempt to influence the election or produce the outcome which they desire. If the elections are conducted soon after liberation by persons without party affiliations and while the United Nations' representatives are still in Greece and may be called upon to supervise and guarantee their genuineness, there may be an assurance that Greece may be spared the risks and evils of political revolts and bloodshed.

It is to be hoped that this may also blunt the edge of more serious social turmoil. Indeed, it has been taken for granted that revolutions will meet or follow the arrival of the Allied forces in the liberated countries. These may be formless or unorganized and an expression of pent-up emotions and

popular resentment against authority in general. This danger is greater in countries like Greece where the existence of the dictatorship before the war did not permit the functioning of the safety valve allowed by democratic processes in the solution of economic and social problems.

Serious problems of this kind existed in Greece in the interval between the two world wars, and they explain the emergence of a communist party in Greece significant in its number and leadership. The party recruited its following not only from the working classes but also among low-paid white collar workers, and more particularly among a new generation confronted with limited opportunities and hard struggles. Indeed the communists gave expression to the general dissatisfaction of all these groups over economic conditions. The communist party also managed to exercise a controlling influence on the parliamentary system due to the fact that the electoral system of proportional representation created the need for coalition governments. As a result, the party was often placed in a strong bargaining position.

A careful study of the domestic situation in Greece between the two wars will disclose that behind the political turmoil that fills the history of the times and the inability of the parliamentary system to function normally, there was a groping for a process to satisfy new economic and social demands and claims which the country had no traditional processes of solving. The Greek state struggled for many years after 1922 to solve the terrific economic and social problems caused by the need of absorbing a million and a half refugees. Similarly, the servicing of a heavy foreign debt and the overcoming of the effects of the international depression and the restrictions on international trade which closed the markets to Greek products created new problems. At the root of the difficulties were the natural poverty of the country and the low national income which was barely sufficient to maintain a steadily increasing population.

The Greek State made considerable efforts to increase production and achieve greater economic security for its citizens. The limited success of these efforts must be attributed mainly to the following causes:

First, the defective system of taxation. It is well known that in order to increase the scope of its activities, a government must command sufficient revenue. In Greece, the greater proportion of public revenue came from indirect taxes which are generally recognized to be repressive and to hit disproportionately the lower incomes. It was a distressing feature of Greek economic policy that each new State activity, undertaken with a view to meeting an urgent social need, was accompanied by the imposition of new indirect taxes and therefore by an increase in the burdens of the poor. In particular, the heavy taxes and dues on inland transportation had a decidedly harmful effect on production and consumption.

Secondly, the prevailing high rates of interest* which not only hampered production, but also, by ensuring a high return on money capital, intensified the unequal distribution of wealth.

* The legal rate of interest was 9% but it is well known that the real interest reached up to 20%.

Thirdly, the heavy protection accorded to industry, while necessary in order to make the country less dependent on imports, meant heavy sacrifices on the part of the consumers and great profits for the industrialists. The net result of the protection accorded to industry was, therefore, that while it increased the total volume of goods available in the country, at the same time it increased the existing inequality in the distribution of those goods.

Lastly, although existing resources were limited, financial and monetary orthodoxy did not always ensure their full utilization for the benefit of the community. Thus, we see the striking fact that the volume of industrial output in Greece during the pre-war period fluctuated from year to year by as much as 15 to 30 per cent as a result of a decrease in world economic activity or of internal monetary or financial policies. The existence of unemployed resources may be tolerated in a wealthy country, but in a poor country like Greece it is a tragic waste. The fact that in most countries during the pre-war period there was a failure to achieve the maximum return from existing resources should not blind us to the conclusion that the only way of ensuring greater economic security and more tolerable conditions of life for the majority of the Greek population is to see to it that all that can be physically produced should be produced under all circumstances; and second, that the national income, however limited it may be, should be treated like a pool in which all citizens are entitled to have a share ensuring them of the satisfaction of their minimum needs and relieving them from fear and anxiety. No country can claim poverty as an excuse for allowing sections of its population to go hungry, at least not so long as other sections satisfy more than their minimum needs.

The realization that these were the deeper problems of pre-war Greece, an opinion which is shared by informed and enlightened Greek leaders, will no doubt suggest to those aspiring to play a role in guiding the destinies of the Greek nation in the post-war era to admit frankly and openly the real issues confronting the people. These issues are going to be more stupendous and overwhelming after the liberation of the country.

The stuff of political life in these times is no longer the political form of government, but the economic and social welfare of the people. Greek polity, be it a crowned or uncrowned Republic, will be judged by the extent to which it succeeds in carrying out the democratic principles of equality and security in the economic field and in cultural advancement. Greek leaders will be aware, it is hoped, of the paramount importance of programs and plans for giving a chance to all classes of the people, particularly the least fortunate, to enjoy the several freedoms enunciated by the United Nations and of the necessity of utilizing the wonderful spirit and inner capacities of the Greek people for creative ends in the social, economic and cultural fields.

The American Friends of Greece have high hopes and a solid faith in the future of Greece. The country will be confronted with stupendous problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation from the devastation wrought by the Axis occupation. There is great expectation that Greece will be aided to

the utmost by the United States and other United Nations toward recovery. But the real and fundamental work will be done by the Greek people themselves. As Greek history of the past teaches us, the triumphant spirit of the Greek people, triumphant in defeat as well as in victory, should manifest at the end of the war a release of moral forces capable of achievements in all fields of endeavors. It is the fervent hope of the friends of Greece that the government will help along this creative release by intelligent planning and action.

STEPHEN P. LADAS

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